아리스토텔레스 논리학 연구 - dictum de omni et nullo와아리스토텔레스의 “특칭”문장

Abstract

This paper starts with Jonathan Barnes’ view on Aristotle’s logic, especially on Aristotle’s notion of perfect syllogism. In his recent book, Truth, etc. Barnes presents and discusses two interpretations of dictum de omni et nullo and, based on the discussion, arrives at the conclusion that no predicative syllogism of Aristotle is perfect. His main reason for that conclusion is that there is no adequate interpretation of the dictum that shows to be perfect all and only the syllogisms that Aristotle says are perfect. I argue against Barnes that 1) Aristotle did not, as Barnes considered, need to formuate dictum de aliquo et aliquo non in addition to dictum de omni et nullo to adequately explain perfect syllogisms and 2) Aristotle’s account of perfect syllogism is fully adequate, as it is. In the mean while, I argue for the interpretation of the dictum that Barnes called ‘unorthodox’ and rejected in his book. This “unorthodox” interpretation of the dictum, when it is applied to Aristotle’s theory of predication in general, will show that we do not have to apply the set-theoretic semantics of the modern predicate logic to Aristotle’s logic. I suggest that “particular” (en merei or kata meros) statements in Aristotle should be understood as “partial” (‘부분(部分)칭’ in Korean) statements, sticking to the meaning of the original Greek word meros.