아리스토텔레스에 있어서의 필연성과 소위 아리스토텔레스적 본질주의 －콰인의 반(反)본질주의와 관련하여

Abstract

I address two issues regarding Aristotelian modality. One issue concerns whether Aristotle is a modal realist. Is modality in Aristotle part of the objective world or is it somehow dependent on how we use our language or concepts? My answer is that Aristotle is a modal realist all right, but a peculiar kind, peculiar because his metaphysical stance is fundamentally different from ours. Another issue is whether Quine’s so-called Aristotelian essentialism is really Aristotelian. My answer is negative. When I explain why so-called Aristotelian essentialism is not Aristotelian, I will have a chance to discuss Aristotle’s metaphysical stance. The picture emerging out of my discussion of Aristotelian substances shows that there is a third alternative beside anti-essentialism of Quine and what he and other scholars have characterized as Aristotelian essentialism. During the course, the difference between Aristotelian metaphysics and the metaphysics that dominates the modern mind is noted and the applicability of modern logical notions/devices to Aristotle’s philosophy questioned. I suggest that we should be very careful in approaching Aristotle’s philosophy with the modern logical notions/devices since modern philosophy and logic are, I believe, on a quite different metaphysical footing from that on which Aristotle’s philosophy stands. I suggest at the end the notion of dynamic necessity as a basic framework to understand Aristotelian necessity.