'하노이 미북회담' 이후 북한의 핵전략 변화와 한미동맹의 대응방안

Abstract

Kim Jong-un's summit meeting, he declared nuclear completion and launched a peace offensive, was halted in Hanoi. Since the collapse of the Hanoi U.S.-North Korea summit, North Korea has accelerated its advancement of nuclear armament and has explicitly threatened the South. The unexpected fact that North Korea focused on launching short-range ballistic missiles rather than medium and long-range after the negotiations broke down, as well as the fact that it enacted the Nuclear Force Policy Act to complete the nuclear doctrine and conducted for fifteen days training of tactical nuclear operating units, disproves this. Although the talks broke down, it can be presumed that Kim Jong-un learned that the possibility of U.S. military intervention in North Korea, which actually possesses nuclear weapons, that South Korea can be excluded and isolated from nuclear issues, and that he can secure a lead in the Korean Peninsula for the time being. North Korea's commitment to change the status quo on the Korean Peninsula has been fully reflected in its tactical nuclear operation unit training since the enactment of the Nuclear Force Policy Act. The fifteen days practical training seems to have been conducted in accordance with the elaborate scenario of implementing preemptive strike of tactical nuclear weapons ⇒ deter U.S. intervention ⇒ the second mission accomplished. Contrary to previous assessments, North Korea's nuclear strategy has gained traction in its aggressive military objectives. It's moving beyond minimum deterrence to limited deterrence strategies. Despite the extreme lack of national resources, it is estimated that the North Korea is shifting from confirmatory retaliation to asymmetric expansion posture to optimize the nuclear posture. It can be seen that North Korea's fundamental goal of nuclear armament from the beginning was not to eliminate the U.S. nuclear threat, but to secure advantage on the Korean Peninsula and complete territorial integrity. As part of his nuclear capability advancement, Kim Jong-un is concentrating on developing tactical nuclear weapons, openly threatening South Korea, and changing the status quo, but the future is not smooth. This is due to the fact that Kim Jong-un's nuclear armament policy is mired in a policy dilemma, a security dilemma, and a strategic dilemma. The three dilemmas faced by Kim Jong-un's nuclear armament are not separate and independent, but are complex and organically working at the same time, adding to the difficulties of the North Korean authorities, and we must recognize this and make the most of it. The 'Washington Declaration' can be evaluated as the peak of the South Korea-U.S. extended deterrence strategy, which has made significant progress in responding to the growing North Korean nuclear threat, but it cannot be considered a fundamental measure for denuclearizing North Korea. From Kim Jong-un's point of view, the 'Washington Declaration' is an internal and external announcement that South Korea still cannot have nuclear weapons and cannot attempt nuclear development. Kim will think that it can gain an upper hand in nuclear power within the Korean Peninsula. Also has fundamental limitations of the 'declaration'. In order for the extended deterrence of the South Korea-U.S. alliance to operate normally and ultimately achieve North Korea's denuclearization, it is necessary to first remove the security obstacles caused by the complacency of winning the system competition and ‘separating North Korean nuclear threats and countermeasures from military issues’. And strategically shift the North Korean nuclear frame from the ‘U.S.-North Korean frame’ to the ‘U.S.-South-North Korean stakeholders frame’. In order to achieve North Korea's denuclearization fundamentally and practically, the government should pursue a ‘three-stage nuclear balance strategy’ based on conditions that calls for securing Japanese-level nuclear potential as a first-phase implementation alternative, Korean-style nuclear sharing as a second-phase preliminary alternative, and nuclear armament as a third-phase final alternative. The three stage of the "nuclear balance strategy" can be carried out sequentially or step by step, a combination between stages is possible, and when the fundamental goal of denuclearizing North Korea is achieved, all stages being pursued are in the process of abolition.