식의 관념성과 외계실재론 비판 -『물질과 기억』, 『중론』, 『유식이십론』을 중심으로

Abstract

The statement ‘no external object, cognition only(唯識無境)’, it looks like the declaration of the buddhist idealism and does not correspond with our ordinary experiences. And also the natural laws which provide a solid foundation for our modern culture could be completely coincidental, then the knowledge of these laws would be little short of a miracle. It would confront the critique which the idealistic interpretations on mādhyamika and vijñānavādin could not embrace our concrete and real experiences, it would rather draw support the arguments to approve the external objects as the inevitability or universality of the natural law. It changes direction of our discussion if we shed light on the duality of the six roots. That is, if mano-vijñãna have six sense-objects of sense and six cognitions, we need to review what is possible. First, we summarize how to dismiss the external world at Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and Viṃśatikā-vijñaptimātratāsidhi-śāstra which are the main sutras of mādhyamika and vijñānavādin through debating with Sarvastivada and Sautrantika which accept the external objects. In succession, recognizing the moving world as it is, and by this premise, then deducing the materiality of consciousness with Matière et mémoire, we reconstitute the thought of Bergson. Based on this discussion, we have examined both objections of the idealistic and realistic interpretation on external objects, then reconsidered the idealistic interpretation of mādhyamika and vijñānavādin and the realistic one on the material world. Finally, After arguing that we eliminate problems both of the theory of external object and of the idealism through the body-image which interact with various images differently with material images interacting each other, we will move on to the possibility of new discussions on ‘no external object, cognition only’. Likewise, if we could discuss critically problems of the idealism of vijñãna and of the external realism with the theory of Bergson’s image, the gap of vijñãna and matter will not so large. Accordingly it is not concentrate on the cognition without the paramanu, If we accepted the fact deducing the cognition from the matter, the direction of the discussion is completely different. Eventually it could be revealed that the matter is idealistic like vijñãna, and vijñãna is realistic like the matter.