龍樹의 『중론』과 비트겐슈타인의 저작에 등장하는 두 종류의 관계

Abstract

In Wittgenstein’s internal and external relations used in his early philosophy, the later can be regarded as the same concept as ‘different’ of Nāgārjuna. In fact, external relation is a common world view as a relationship between things considered independent, and therefore there is no reason to differ from the Eastern and Western philosophical traditions. However, in the case of the internal relation, Wittgenstein’s early philosophy distinguishes it from ‘one’ of Nāgārjuna due to his atomistic ontology. Nevertheless, the fact that internal relations fall into the definition of circularity, and that it is a necessary relation between formal concepts, is the same as that of Nāgārjuna’s ‘one’ i.e. ’the relations between the parts when one is divided. According to Nāgārjuna’ argumentations in his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, the core doctrine of buddhistic philosophy, i.e. dependent origination(pratītyasamutpāda) is the act of constructing a boundary by dividing a whole into parts, and this act is contradictory due to the overlap of the two relations ‘one’ and ‘different’, Emptiness(Śūnyatā) means that there is no substance at these boundaries and our language is deeply involved in the act of creating boundaries On the other hand, Wittgenstein himself dismissed his atomistic worldview in later philosophy. Now the language or world does not have a logical form given uniquely, but its internal structure can change according to the aspect and purpose of language game. Furthermore, the language or the world may be in a state in which there is no relation internally, that is, not divided. In this respect, it would also be meaningful to study Wittgenstein’s internal and external relations, and the two relations ‘one’ and ‘different’ in Nāgārjuna’s work side by side.