베트남 전쟁 중 미국의 핵무기 불사용 요인에 관한 연구: 자기억제모델을 중심으로
A Study on factors of US non-use of nuclear weapon in the Vietnam War : focusing on the self-deterrence model
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초록
본 논문은 베트남 전쟁 당시 미국이 핵무기 사용을 고려한 시점에서 핵무기를 사용하지 않은 요인을 설명하는 데 목적이 있다. 지금까지 미국의 핵무기 불사용 요인은 비용 대 이익의 합리적 계산의 결과 또는 금기(taboo), 불사용 전통과 같은 독특한 현상으로 설명되어 왔다. 그러나 본 논문에서는 미국의 핵무기 불사용 요인이 '자기억제'에 의해 결정된다는 것을 주장한다. 이를 위해 먼저 미국이 약소국을 억제하고자 할 때 직면하게 되는 '핵 억제 딜레마'의 개념을 설명하고 자기억제와 핵무기 사용 가능성 사이의 관계를 보여주는 '자기억제 모델'을 제시한다. 이를 통해 베트남 전쟁 중 전략적 실패에 직면한 미국이 끝까지 핵무기 사용을 스스로 억제한 요인을 분석한다. 이로써 본 연구는 전쟁의 목적, 핵무기 역량, 동맹국의 지원, 핵 문턱에 대한 확전 가능성이라는 요인에 의해 미국의 핵무기 사용은 자기억제 된다는 점을 주장할 것이다.
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to explain why the US did not use nuclear weapons during the Vietnam War, considering the use of nuclear weapons, and to identify the factors. Until now, the factor of US non-use of nuclear weapon has been explained in terms of the calculation of cost-benefit or a unique cultural phenomenon such as the tradition of non-use and taboo. However, this paper argues that US non-use of nuclear weapons is determined by 'self-deterrence'. Self-deterrence can be defined as the self-restraint of the use of nuclear weapons by certain variables of the nuclear weapon states, regardless of the threat of the opponent's suppression. For this purpose, this study first explains the concept of 'nuclear deterrence dilemma' that the US faces with the weak countries and suggests 'self-deterrence model' which shows the relation between self-deterrence and the possibility of using nuclear weapons. Second, when the United States faced strategic failure in the Vietnam War, it analyzes why the United States did not use nuclear weapons. In conclusion, this study will argue that the United States is self-controlled through factors such as the purpose of war, the capability of nuclear weapons, the support of allies, and the possibility of escalation on the nuclear threshold.
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