반출생주의 비판-비대칭성과 삶의 질에 관한 논쟁을 중심으로-

Abstract

According to antinatalism, life is permeated by suffering, and procreation constitutes a moral wrong. As this position stands in sharp contrast to widely shared intuitions, antinatalism has rarely been afforded serious philosophical consideration. Yet the doctrine is now attracting increasing social attention, accompanied by a growing number of adherents, which underscores the urgency of theoretical engagement with its claims. This study evaluates the validity of antinatalism’s principal arguments by focusing on the debate between David Benatar, its most prominent advocate, and David Overall, one of Benatar’s major critics. In particular, the analysis reconstructs two of Benatar’s central arguments, the Asymmetry Argument and the Quality of Life Argument, and examines Overall’s criticisms alongside Benatar’s rejoinders. The findings indicate that Overall’s critique effectively undermines Benatar’s Asymmetry Argument. By contrast, Overall’s objections to the Quality of Life Argument prove less persuasive and require further substantiation. Although Overall appeals to the conceptual complexity of quality of life, such a response is not difficult to counter and may, in fact, be co-opted as supporting evidence for Benatar’s claim that self-assessments of life quality are unreliable. This study contends that a more compelling response would emphasize that, however imperfect, the authority to evaluate the quality of life resides solely with the individual subject. Taken together, these findings suggest that antinatalism lacks philosophical robustness. Nonetheless, the growing prominence of antinatalist thought may be interpreted as a demand for deeper moral reflection and responsibility concerning those who are yet to be born. It calls upon current generations to restructure society so that future individuals may pursue meaning and enhance the quality of their lives.