儒家 正名論 다시 보기

Abstract

This paper views Confucian rectifying names as ‘the process of ethicalargumentation’, after dealing with the previous interpretations of ConfucianRectifying Names such as the theory of names and objects, the theory ofrole-specific obligations, the theory of performative action, and the theory oflinguistic presupposition. According to it, names and objects are notindependent, but interdependent. The process of rectifying names in thisinterpretation is basically viewed as the cognitive process of recreativelydefining, vindicating and transforming both names and objects. Although it canbe seen as cognitive process, it also has the practical aspect of moral behavioursuch as ‘living up to one’s names’ (doing one’s duties and responsibilitiesassociated with one's own names). This cognitive process is concrete in that itoccurs in the contexts of prior systems of naming, of conventions and of ourphysical movements, together with our emotive and volitional aspects. It,however, is also intellectual in that it contains critical and reflective aspects andalso dominates the above emotive and volitional aspects. To conclude, rectifyingnames is a moral activity in Confucian tradition where practice and theory orreason and emotion are intermingled. Nonetheless, we cannot deny that practiceand reason are relatively more emphasized.