연립정부의 내적 정책갈등 관리메커니즘: 독일의 사례분석
Management Mechanism of Internal Policy Conflicts in Coalition Government: the German Case
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독일의 저력은 정치 안정성에 있다. 내각 책임제가 가진 정치적 불안이라는 제도적단점과 달리 대통령제보다 훨씬 안정적인 정치를 보여주고 있다. 독일은 내각책임제의단점을 어떻게 극복하였는가? 이 글은 연립정부의 정책갈등을 예방하는 관리 메커니즘이 독일의 주요 정치안정요인이라고 보고, 서로 다른 정책선호를 가진 정당들이 함께구성한 연립내각의 내부적 갈등을 막는 제도들이 독일에서는 어떻게 작용하는지를 살펴보았다. 사례분석을 위한 대상으로는 2005년과 2009년 총선 이후 메르켈 총리의 1, 2 기 집권기에 해당하는 연립정부를 다루었다. 그리하여 이 기간 동안에 나타난 정책갈등과 관리메커니즘을 분석하였다. 분석 결과 독일의 연립정부에서는 다양한 정책갈등 관리메커니즘이 활용되고 있다는 것을 발견하였다. 주요 제도로는 장관직의 배분, 연정협약서, 정무차관제, 중위정당의 영향력, 이념적 관계 등이 있다.
Abstract
The strength of Germany is the political stability. The German parliamentary system shows more stability than the presidential system despite its alleged institutional fault. How can Germany overcome its institutional fault. This paper finds its success factor in the management mechanism of policy conflicts within coalition government and explains how it works for regulating the conflicts among parties having divergent policy preferences. The case study analyzes the coalition governments of Chancelor Merkel after 2005 and 2009 general elections. The analysis shows that the governments employ a variety of instutional components for the policy conflicts management such as distribution of cabinet, coalition agreement, junior minister, median party, and ideological relationship.
참고문헌 (21)
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