1인칭 사유의 외부에서 윤리적 주체를 세울 수 있을까? :‘책임’ 개념을 바탕으로 하는 복수 주체들의 윤리학

Abstract

This article aims to suggest that multiple subjects could be the ethical subject beyond the first person. Generally, ethics presuppose the first person, since the responsibility requires a certain performer. However, the ethics based on the first person would not elucidate collective apolgies. In this regard A. MacIntyre and M. Sandel as communitarian thinkers argue what kind of ethical subject could take the responsibility for collective apologies. According to “narrative selfhood” suggested by those thinkers, “I” is always in part of other’s story and vice versa the other is always in part of “my” story. “Narrative selfgood” is therefore to emphasize the intimate relationship between “I” and others. On the other hand D. Haraway focuses on the problem of responsibility which is necessary for multiple subjects to live together. Haraway argues that this problem is realistic and urgent for multiple subjects. MacIntyre and Haraway consider the concept of accountability in common, but the concept implies different practical meanings for each of them. For MacIntyre, accountability is a final destination, but for Haraway accountability is a starting point for responsibility. According to Haraway, co-performers are always interconnected in an unequal and inhomogeneous manners. Therefore, unless ongoing efforts are carried out between subjects in an unequal relationship, the responsibility for building a commune by “intelligibility” cannot be fulfilled. Even though settling multiple subjects as an ethical subject, the narrative selfhood of MacIntyre eventually could not be an appropriate answer for how to live together; for MacIntyre overlooks the condition of inequality and inhomogeneity in the multiple subjects. In this respect, this article analyses Haraway’s arguments about how responsibility should be considered and performed in order to live together.