한반도 군비통제 적용방안: 유럽의 MBFR 사례를 중심으로

Abstract

After World War II, Europe was divided into communist camps centered on the Soviet Union and free camps centered on the United States, and the U.S. and Soviet Union fell into a security dilemma through a balance of fear, accelerating the nuclear arms race. Under these circumstances, the MBFR talks were an attempt to reduce the number of troops through negotiations in Central Europe, where the U.S. and the Soviet Union mutually agreed on the need to reduce military threats and the most conventional forces were concentrated on a large scale. At the MBFR talks, NATO and WTO negotiated by applying the same response strategy (TFT) based on reciprocity principles, while NATO demanded a balanced reduction in the WTO's troop reduction in an unequal manner, while the WTO aimed to negotiate a reduction in NATO's qualitatively dominant weapons system. As such, the two sides failed to eliminate mutual distrust, such as differences in different negotiation purposes and unreliable data presented to each other, and consequently, the 16-year MBFR talks failed. Therefore, in this paper, the background and progress of the MBFR talks were first investigated, and the negotiation strategies of both sides were summarized to analyze the cause of the failure of the MBFR talks. And finally, I would like to find out what the MBFR talks really meant for NATO and the WTO's two camps, and based on their achievements, I would like to find out how to apply to arms control negotiations on the Korean Peninsula.