경기자-외부성 경합: 내쉬-쿠르노 모형과 스타켈버그 모형
Contest with Player-Externalities: A Nash-Cournot Model and Two Stackelberg Models
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초록
경합능력, 지대의 크기, 타이밍, 외부성 등은 경기자의 행위와 보수에 영향을 미친다. 본 연구는 경기자-외부성 경합에서 이러한 변수의 역할을 조명한다. 이를 위해, 경합을세 가지 유형으로 분류한다: 내쉬-쿠르노 모형, 경쟁력이 높은 (낮은) 경기자가 선도자인 스타켈버그 모형. 관련 문헌에서 얻지 못한 주요 결과는 다음과 같다: (1) ‘경쟁력이낮은 경기자’는 열세자, ‘경쟁력이 높은 경기자’는 우세자가 된다; (2) 외부효과가 일정수준이 되고 열세자가 선도자가 아니라면, 열세자는 우세자에 비해 높은 기대보수를얻을 수 있다; (3) 외부성이 작다면, 열세자는 외부효과를 포기하고 선도자가 되기를원할 수 있다.
Abstract
Contest ability, size of territory, timing, externalities, and others, influence players’ behavior and expected payoffs. This study sheds light on the role of these variables in player externality contests. Contests are classified into the Nash-Cournot model and the Stackelberg model, which has a high (low) competitive ability leader. Key results not obtained in the related literature are as follows: (1) The “low (high) contest ability competitor” becomes the underdog (the favorite); (2) If external effects reach a certain level and the underdog is not the leader, the underdog can obtain higher expected payoff than the favorite; and (3) If external effects are sufficiently small, the underdog may want to become the leader while relinquishing the effects.
참고문헌 (19)
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