내생적 시간을 고려한 승자외부성 경합의 기대보수와 지대소진
Expected Payoffs and Rent Dissipation in Contests with Winner Externality Considering Endogenous Timing
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Baik and Shogren(1992)과 Leininger(1993)는 내생적 시간을 고려한 경합에서 열세자가 선도자 그리고 우세자가 추종자를 선택하는 결과를 보였다. 본 연구는 승자외부성 경합을 고려하여 선행연구들의 결과가 유지됨을 보인다. 이를 위해, 한 개의 동시적 의사결정 하부게임과 두 개의 순차적 의사결정 하부게임들을 고려하면서 열세자와 선도자 중에서 누가 먼저 노력수준을 선택하는지에 대해 알아본다. 본 연구는 각 하부게임균형으로부터 얻은 기대보수를 비교함으로써 Baik and Shogren(1992)과 Leininger(1993)의 결과를 유도한다: 하부게임완전균형은 열세자가 선도자 그리고 우세자가 추종자를 선택하는 것이다. 다음으로, 세 하부게임균형 중에서 열세자가 선도자 그리고 우세자가 추종자인 경우에 실질적 지대소진이 가장 낮음을 보인다.
Abstract
Baik and Shogren(1992) and Leininger(1993) showed that in two-player contests, the players prefer to compete for the underdog to be the leader. This study leads to the results of Baik and Shogren(1992) and Leininger(1993) with winner externality considering asymmetric prizes. To show such results, we examine three kinds of subgames: (a) a simultaneous-move subgame; (b) a sequential-move subgame in which the player who competes for a high prize is a leader, and (c) a sequential-move subgame in which the player competes for a low prize is a leader. Next, we show that the results of Baik and Shogren(1992) are derived by comparing the equilibrium expected payoffs in three kinds of subgames. In addition, we show that the real rent-dissipation rate is the lowest when the underdog is a leader and the favorite is a follower.
참고문헌 (18)
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