Contests with linear externality in prizes
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This study examines contests in which prizes are affected linearly by aggregate effort. In particular, this research analyzes a contest among individuals as a benchmark to scrutinize the effects of prize externality and sharing-rule information on rent-dissipation rate and social welfare. Thereafter, the current study investigates two types of group contest with linear prize externality: one with private information on intra-group sharing rules and the other with public information on intra-group sharing rules. Results indicate as follows. (1) An increase in prize externality increases rent-dissipation rate but has no effect on social welfare. (2) The group contest with private information on sharing rules yields higher social welfare and lower rent-dissipation rate than the one with public information on sharing rules.
Abstract
This study examines contests in which prizes are affected linearly by aggregate effort. In particular, this research analyzes a contest among individuals as a benchmark to scrutinize the effects of prize externality and sharing-rule information on rent-dissipation rate and social welfare. Thereafter, the current study investigates two types of group contest with linear prize externality: one with private information on intra-group sharing rules and the other with public information on intra-group sharing rules. Results indicate as follows. (1) An increase in prize externality increases rent-dissipation rate but has no effect on social welfare. (2) The group contest with private information on sharing rules yields higher social welfare and lower rent-dissipation rate than the one with public information on sharing rules.
참고문헌 (16)
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