내생적 환경오염과 지대소진
Endogenous Environmental Damage and Its Impact on Rent Dissipation
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환경분쟁 관련 선행연구들은 오염피해자가 선도자로서 분쟁에 임할 때 사회후생(지대소진)이 증가(감소)함을 보인다. 선행연구와 달리, 본 연구는 제품생산량에 따라 환경오염이 변화하는 상황을 고려하면서, 선행연구의 결과가 유지되는지 알아본다. 이를 위해 본 연구는 다음과 같은 네 개의 모형을 설정한다: (i) 꾸르노 환경분쟁, (ii) 스타켈버그 환경분쟁, (iii) 비대칭정보 환경분쟁, (iv) 외부화 환경분쟁. 외부화 환경분쟁을 제외한 세 모형에서 오염원인자(기업)는 제품생산에 따른 오염피해액을 자신의비용으로 내부화하는 생산량을 선택하고, 기업과 오염피해자는 오염피해액을 상금으로하는 경합에 참여한다. 꾸르노 환경분쟁에서 기업과 오염피해자는 동시에 노력수준을선택한다. 스타켈버그 환경분쟁에서 오염피해자가 먼저 노력수준을 선택한 후, 기업이노력수준을 선택한다. 비대칭정보 환경분쟁에서는 기업이 결정한 생산량을 오염피해자가 인지하지 못한 상황에서 꾸르노-환경분쟁이 발생한다. 본 연구의 주요 결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 꾸르노 환경분쟁에서 지대소진이 가장 낮고, 외부화 환경분쟁에서 지대소진이 가장 높다. 둘째, 스타켈버그 환경분쟁보다 꾸르노환경분쟁에서 기업의 순이윤이 크고 오염피해자의 순손실이 작다. 이 결과는 스타켈버그 환경분쟁이 사회후생(지대소진)을 증가(감소)시킨다는 선행연구의 결과와 배치된다.
Abstract
Previous studies on environmental conflicts show that social welfare(rent dissipation) increases(decreases) when polluted victims are leaders. Unlike previous studies, this study considers the change of environmental damage according to the output a firm produces and examines whether the results of prvious studies are maintained. This study analyzes environmental conflicts considering four models: (i) Cournot environmental conflict, (ii) Stackelberg environmental conflict, (iii) environmental conflict with asymmetric information, and (iv) environmental conflict with externalization. In all three conflicts except the conflict with externalization, a firm chooses outputs that internalize the expected losses from environmental conflicts at its own costs. In the Cournot environmental conflict, a firm and a pollution victim chooses their effort levels at the same time to win the contest for indemnity due to environmental pollution. In the Stackelberg environmental conflict, a polluted victim first chooses her effort level, and in turn, a firm chooses its effort level. In the conflict with asymmetric information, Cournot environmental conflict arises when a polluted victim is not aware of the product output chosen by a firm. The main conclusions of this study are as follows. First, internalization of environmental conflict reduces rent dissipation. Second, in Cournot environmental conflict, the net profit of the firm is higher and the net loss of the polluted victim is smaller than those of Stackelberg environmental conflict. Finally, rent dissipation is the lowest in the Cournot environmental conflict. This result is different from the results of previous studies.
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