Pakistan’s Minimum Deterrence and its Policy Approach toward Fissile Materials: Security Concerns and the Region’s Changed Strategic Environment
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In the immediate aftermath of nuclear weapon tests in May 1998, Pakistan optedfor a policy of minimum deterrence, which entailed that Pakistan would not needa larger number of nuclear deterrent forces, as a small number of them would besufficient to deter. The concept of a minimum deterrence existed even beforePakistan tested nuclear weapons. However, later Islamabad realized that minimumcould not be sustained as earlier conceptualized. It needed to be evolving anddynamic. Minimum deterrence (MD) transformed into minimum credible deterrence(MCD) which had policy implications for Pakistan’s force-building structure. Among its force building, Pakistan not only upgrades its deterrent forces, but alsobuilds more nuclear reactors which makes Islamabad reluctant to withdraw itsveto from the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). It requires more fissilematerials in order to enhance its deterrent credibility. Why does Islamabad dothis, and if its policy approach remains consistent with the minimum deterrence itconceptualized earlier? This article examines the rudimentary factors that increasePakistan’s security concerns and elaborates on Pakistan’s post-1998 shifting policyapproach toward fissile materials in the region’s changed strategic environment.
Abstract
In the immediate aftermath of nuclear weapon tests in May 1998, Pakistan optedfor a policy of minimum deterrence, which entailed that Pakistan would not needa larger number of nuclear deterrent forces, as a small number of them would besufficient to deter. The concept of a minimum deterrence existed even beforePakistan tested nuclear weapons. However, later Islamabad realized that minimumcould not be sustained as earlier conceptualized. It needed to be evolving anddynamic. Minimum deterrence (MD) transformed into minimum credible deterrence(MCD) which had policy implications for Pakistan’s force-building structure. Among its force building, Pakistan not only upgrades its deterrent forces, but alsobuilds more nuclear reactors which makes Islamabad reluctant to withdraw itsveto from the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). It requires more fissilematerials in order to enhance its deterrent credibility. Why does Islamabad dothis, and if its policy approach remains consistent with the minimum deterrence itconceptualized earlier? This article examines the rudimentary factors that increasePakistan’s security concerns and elaborates on Pakistan’s post-1998 shifting policyapproach toward fissile materials in the region’s changed strategic environment.
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