Strategizing for Deterrence Stability in South Asia: Looking for a Holistic Approach
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Before the arrival of nuclear weapons in South Asia, both India and Pakistan had fought several wars. The arrival of nuclear weapons has made both the South Asian nuclear weapons states more cautious to fight. This caution and restraint is directly associated with the fear of using nuclear weapons, the damage of which remains unacceptable to both the adversaries. Although nuclear weapons are considered for deterrence purposes and they are assumed to provide deterrence stability, they are not a guaranteed panacea for all the outstanding issues including the core issue of Kashmir. This absence of a guaranteed solution for these problems despite the presence of nuclear weapons entails the deterrence instability in South Asia, even though neither India nor Pakistan are directly fighting anymore because of the fear of major military escalation to a nuclear use. This paper talks about at least three major dynamics associated with nuclear weapons that might help promote deterrence stability in South Asia. It asks for the consistent practice of minimum deterrence that was initially conceptualized, focuses on the practices of defensive doctrinal postures between India and Pakistan, and calls for an arms control regime (ACR) that does not yet exist in South Asia. In addition to other peaceful measures discussed in the existing literature, the amalgamation of these three ingredients and the commonalities within them could play an important role in promoting deterrence stability in South Asia.
Abstract
Before the arrival of nuclear weapons in South Asia, both India and Pakistan had fought several wars. The arrival of nuclear weapons has made both the South Asian nuclear weapons states more cautious to fight. This caution and restraint is directly associated with the fear of using nuclear weapons, the damage of which remains unacceptable to both the adversaries. Although nuclear weapons are considered for deterrence purposes and they are assumed to provide deterrence stability, they are not a guaranteed panacea for all the outstanding issues including the core issue of Kashmir. This absence of a guaranteed solution for these problems despite the presence of nuclear weapons entails the deterrence instability in South Asia, even though neither India nor Pakistan are directly fighting anymore because of the fear of major military escalation to a nuclear use. This paper talks about at least three major dynamics associated with nuclear weapons that might help promote deterrence stability in South Asia. It asks for the consistent practice of minimum deterrence that was initially conceptualized, focuses on the practices of defensive doctrinal postures between India and Pakistan, and calls for an arms control regime (ACR) that does not yet exist in South Asia. In addition to other peaceful measures discussed in the existing literature, the amalgamation of these three ingredients and the commonalities within them could play an important role in promoting deterrence stability in South Asia.
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