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Reassessing Deterrence Dynamics and Fragility of Peace in South Asia

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This study reassesses conflicting strategic behavior of India and Pakistan in the changed regional environment. It predominantly focuses on evaluating the two states’ behavior in regard to their nuclear doctrines, strategies, force postures and, operational plans and their impact on deterrence stability/instability. It continues by examining the following questions: Why do these states behave distinctly on their strategic goals that make peace precarious and deterrence unstable? How far have the changing security dynamics and emerging doctrinal structures of these states made regional deterrence more or less stable? How can these states stabilize deterrence and secure regional peace? The paper finds that nuclear deterrence in South Asia apparently has stabilized the region but the peace was precariously maintained because the two states have distinct strategic direction and goals. India and Pakistan cannot avoid serious and unavoidable risks of nuclear war until they lay down their all-inclusive military plans, adopt budgetary constraints, institute an arms control mechanism and build a stable political relationship.

Abstract

This study reassesses conflicting strategic behavior of India and Pakistan in the changed regional environment. It predominantly focuses on evaluating the two states’ behavior in regard to their nuclear doctrines, strategies, force postures and, operational plans and their impact on deterrence stability/instability. It continues by examining the following questions: Why do these states behave distinctly on their strategic goals that make peace precarious and deterrence unstable? How far have the changing security dynamics and emerging doctrinal structures of these states made regional deterrence more or less stable? How can these states stabilize deterrence and secure regional peace? The paper finds that nuclear deterrence in South Asia apparently has stabilized the region but the peace was precariously maintained because the two states have distinct strategic direction and goals. India and Pakistan cannot avoid serious and unavoidable risks of nuclear war until they lay down their all-inclusive military plans, adopt budgetary constraints, institute an arms control mechanism and build a stable political relationship.

참고문헌 (59)

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