미국 루스벨트 행정부의 전후 한반도 신탁통치 구상 형성 -그 이상과 현실, 1939~1943-

Abstract

The Asia-Pacific War, which began with Japan’s provocation of the Manchurian Incident in 1931, ended with Japan’s defeat and the victory of the Allies in 1945, 15 years later. Japan provoked the Sino-Japanese War, an all-out war against China in 1937, and began an all-out war with the United States by attacking Pearl Harbor in Hawaii in December 1941. Therefore, throughout the Pacific War II, which began in 1941, as part of the 15-year Asia-Pacific War, the United States fought against Japan with China as a member of the Allied Forces. Therefore, it was natural to consider the possibility of independence of the Korean Peninsula, which was a Japanese colony, if the United States and China defeated Japan’s invasion. Therefore, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, then the President of the United States, pondered over the postwar status of the Korean Peninsula. His conclusion was a trusteeship plan that made the Korean Peninsula independent from the Japanese colonial rule but suspended it for a certain period of time. The trusteeship proposal was not immediately independent, but it was not a denial of independence. The trusteeship plan was an idea that went further toward independence between both ends of “immediate independence” and “continuation of colonial rule.” In Chapter 2, Roosevelt’s process of creating a multinational discipline (guardian system) was examined in combination with the ideal of guaranteeing independence and the reality of securing national interests through checks between the United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and China. Chapter 3 deals with the negative perceptions of the U.S. State Department on the autonomy of the Korean Peninsula, and Chapter 4 mentions the U.S. decision to disapprove the provisional government of the Chinese and Chinese governments. It is confirmed in the next chapter that the negative evaluation of the U.S. immediate independence of Korea covered in Chapters 3 and 4 was reflected in the provisions of the Cairo Declaration on the Korean Peninsula. Chapter 5 examines the decision-making process of the Cairo Declaration related to Korea, focusing on Roosevelt’s initiative. The U.S. State Department has rejected requests from the Provisional Republic of Korea in Chungking and the Chinese Kuomintang Government to approve the Provisional Republic of Korea since 1942. President Roosevelt, who trusted the State Department’s assessment that Koreans lacked autonomy, believed that independence was impossible immediately and that independence could only be achieved through trusteeship, which is the period of autonomy, as in the Philippines. It was a perception that only then could confusion be prevented. In addition, since the Korean Peninsula’s domestic and foreign independence movement forces were divided, the State Department’s refusal to approve the Provisional Republic of Korea further supported Roosevelt’s imposition of the trusteeship period. Therefore, at the Cairo Conference in November 1943, Roosevelt turned a blind eye to Chiang Kai-shek’s hope of immediate independence under the leadership of the Provisional Republic of Korea and carried out the previously considered trusteeship on Korea. He pledged to become independent of the future of the Korean Peninsula after going through an indue course (an expression that implies an indirectly concealed trusteeship rule). The U.S. assessment of Koreans’ lack of self-government experience and the division of Korean independence movement forces could deepen Roosevelt’s refusal to approve the Provisional Republic of Korea and Korea’s immediate independence, eventually producing Cairo Communique on Korea. From an idealist point of view, Roosevelt’s idealism and core diplomatic policymakers’ New Deal idealism, Roosevelt’s anti-colonial and ideal interpretation of US ruling experience in the Philippines, and anti-colonialism created by domestic public opinion at the time, and compassion for people of colonies. However, there was a reality that could not be realized only with these ideals. The term “multinationality”, which modifies Roosevelt’s newly created “guardian system”, was an expression of a realist element to secure the interests of the United States by checking Britain, the Soviet Union, and China. The Roosevelt-style “multinational political training system” is mixed to the ideal of guardianship as an anti-colonial independence differentiated from the mandate system under the influence of colonialism and the reality of securing US national interest. Independence activists such as Kim Koo, who wanted immediate independence, expressed opposition to the trusteeship plan after 1942.