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평판에 대한 고려가 분쟁시 위기결정에 미치는 영향: 1950년대 제1-2차 양안분쟁을 중심으로

The Role of Reputation for Resolve in Crisis Decision-Making: On the Cases of the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crises of the 1950s

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동아시아국제정치학회 (The East Asian Association Of International Studies (Eaais))|2021.09|국제정치연구 (THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)|제24권 제3호|pp. 63-87|DOI https://doi.org/10.15235/jir.2021.09.24.3.63

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참고문헌

키워드

억제전략의지력에 대한 평판사전협상전략제1-2차 양안분쟁평판의 전략적 가치Reputation for resolveDeterrence theoryprenegotiation tacticfirst and second Taiwan Strait crisesstrategic value of reputation
주제분류정치외교학

초록

효율적인 억제 등을 위해 강한 국가 평판을 형성하는 것이 국가 안보와 국익 추구에 유용함에도 불구하고, 왜 국가들은 때로 분쟁 상황에서 물러나는 결정을 하기도 하는가? 본 논문은 이와 같은 질문에 대한 답을 제시하고자 특정 조건 하에서는 국가나 지도자들이 강한 평판대신 온건한 평판의 형성이 유리하다고 판단하며, 이에 따라 분쟁 상황에서 의도적으로 물러나기로 결정한다고 주장한다. 구체적으로, 비용이 증가함에 따라 억제 전략의 장기적인 효용에 대해 의심이 생기는 경우, 그리고 협상 타결보다는 협상 과정을 우선하는 경우 등 두 가지조건이 충족될 때 국제정치 행위자들은 온건한 평판을 추구할 가능성이 높다. 본 논문은 1950 년대에 두 차례 발생한 양안분쟁 당시 미국 아이젠하워 행정부의 위겨결정과정을 비교분석하여 특히 제2차 양안분쟁 당시 미국이 왜 물러나기로 결정하였는지 설명함으로써 핵심 주장을검증한다.

Abstract

Why do states sometimes back down during crises despite the risk of harming their reputation for resolve, a key political asset considered vital to successful deterrence? To address this question, this article argues that under specific conditions, states and leaders consider a moderate, rather than a strong reputation, more suited to its foreign policy objectives and national security and thus opt to deliberately back down accordingly. In particular, actors are likely to prefer a moderate reputation when there is increasing concern about the increasing costs of deterrence caused by escalation across crises, and when they prioritize the process of negotiations over its eventual outcome and seek to induce the participation of their adversary. Case studies of the two Taiwan Strait crises of the 1950s, with particular focus on why the Eisenhower administration chose to back down during the second crisis in 1958, confirms the main argument of this article.

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