핵무기의 전략적 효용과 제약

Abstract

This study investigates why Russia refrained from using nuclear weapons during the Ukraine war by comparing three analytical frameworks: the substitutability of conventional weapons for nuclear weapons, the coercive use of nuclear threats, and the tradition of nuclear non-use. First, the theory of conventional substitution is limited in explanatory power, as Russia failed to achieve its strategic and operational objectives through conventional means. Second, the coercion-based argument lacks persuasive strength, given that Russia’s repeatedly declared “red lines” were violated without triggering meaningful changes in Western behavior. Third, the nuclear non-use theory offers the most compelling explanation, as the potential strategic costs of nuclear use—particularly the risk of backlash from key partners such as China and India—would have significantly undermined Russia’s war efforts. This empirical case of nuclear restraint yields several important policy implications. The attitudes of the international community and major powers toward nuclear use appear to function as constraints, reinforcing the norm of non-use. This contributes positively to the credibility of extended deterrence. Accordingly, in addressing North Korea’s nuclear threat, South Korea must pursue a dual-track strategy that not only enhances its military deterrence capabilities but also cultivates international consensus and diplomatic solidarity in support of nuclear restraint. Keywords: Ukraine War, Nuclear Taboo, Extended Deterrence