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지배구조가 투자에 미치는 영향 : 과대 및 과소 투자기업을 중심으로

The Effect of Corporate Governance on Investment : Focused on Over-and Under-Investment Firms

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참고문헌

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주제분류경영학

초록

본 연구는 과대투자 및 과소투자 기업군에서 투자자보호가 기업의 위험선호에 미치는 영향을 분석하여 투자자보호의 중요성을 실증적으로 검증하고자 하였다. 이와 함께 과대투자 및 과소투자 기업군에서 투자자보호가 위험선호에 미치는 영향의 타당성을 검증하기 위하여 위험선호가 기업가치(또는 기업성과)에 미치는 영향도 분석하였다. 분석결과에 따르면 과대투자 기업군에서는 투자자보호가 우수할수록 투자위험이 낮아지는 것으로 나타났으며, 투자위험이 증가할수록 기업가치(또는 기업성과)는 하락하는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 성장기회가 낮고 현금흐름이 많은 기업에서 대리인 문제로 인해 발생하는 과대투자의 문제가 투자자보호 수준이 우수할수록 완화될 수 있음을 시사한다. 반면 과소투자 기업군에서는 투자자보호가 우수할수록 투자위험이 높아지는 것으로 나타났으며, 이때 투자위험이 증가할수록 기업가치(또는 기업성과)가 상승하는 것으로 분석되었다. 이는 성장기회가 높고 현금흐름이 적은 기업에서 정보비대칭 문제로 인해 발생하는 과소투자의 문제가 투자자보호 수준이 우수할수록 완화될 수 있음을 보여준다. 이러한 본 연구는 기업의 특성이 더욱 다양해지고 있는 상황에서 기업가치(또는 기업성과) 제고에 능동적으로 작동하는 투자자보호의 중요성을 확인하였다는 점에서 의의를 갖는다.

Abstract

This paper empirically examines the importance of investor protection by evaluating the effect of investor protection on corporate risk taking for groups of overinvestment and underinvestment firms. We also investigate the impact of risk taking on firm value to verify the validity of investor protection effect on risk taking for the groups of overinvestment and underinvestment firms. Our empirical findings show that better investor protection leads to lower investment risk and the firm value decreases as investment risk increases for the group of overinvestment firms. It suggests that better investor protection can mitigate the overinvestment problem induced by agency problems in companies with limited growth opportunities and large cash flows. On the other hand, better investor protection leads to higher investment risk and the firm value increases as investment risk rises for the group of underinvestment firms. It indicates that better investor protection can mitigate the underinvestment problem induced by information asymmetry problems in companies with many growth opportunities and low cash flows. This study is significant in the sense that it confirms the importance of investor protection actively enhancing firm value in circumstances where firm characteristics become more diverse.

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