지배주주의 사적이익추구 유인과 기업의 부도 가능성: 소유-지배 괴리도와 부도거리의 관계
Ownership-Control Disparity and Bankruptcy Risk
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자본시장에서 비재무 정보인 ESG(Environmental, Social, and Governance) 요인에대한 정책적, 실무적 관심이 지속해서 확대되고 있다. 특히, 과거 회계 부정 스캔들, 글로벌 금융위기는 지배구조와 부도위험 간의 연관성을 제기하는 촉매제로 작용하였다. 이러한 관점에서 과연 비재무 정보로써 지배구조가 기업의 부도 가능성에 어떻게 연관될수 있는지에 대한 평가가 필요한 시점이다. 본 연구는 지배구조 특성으로 소유-지배괴리도에 기초한 지배주주의 사적이익추구 유인에 주목하여, 동 특성이 부도위험에 미치는영향을 분석한다. 분석 결과, 소유-지배 괴리도의 확대는 부도거리로 측정된 부도위험을상승시키는 것으로 관찰된다. 더불어 지배주주가 50% 이상의 통제권을 보유하거나 직접지분을 보유하지 않은 경우, 이러한 결과는 더욱 강하게 확인된다. 저성장 기조하에서 한국기업들의 부도위험이 점진적으로 확대되는 가운데, 본 연구는 이러한 위험을 사전에관리하기 위한 대안으로 지배구조의 영향력을 실증적으로 제시하는 시사점을 갖는다.
Abstract
After accounting scandals (e.g., Enron, WorldCom, etc.) and the global financial crisis, interests in academic research and policy on the relationship between corporate governance and bankruptcy risk are growing. In this context, this study investigates the effect of ownership-control disparity on the bankruptcy risk in Korea. Empirically, the results reveal that the bankruptcy risk is significantly higher for firms with a wider difference between owner-managers’ control rights and cash flow rights. This result suggests that owner-managers’ incentives to pursue private benefits can undermine the wealth of creditors. Additionally, the main result is more strongly observed with firms where owner-managers have more than 50% of control rights but do not have cash flow rights. There has been a consensus on the negative function of the ownership-control disparity yet empirical evidence on how it is realized was scant. This study can contribute to filling this academic gap.
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