바젤레짐과 자본 적정성의 딜레마: 세계은행 데이터(2019) 분석
A Dilemma of Basel Regime and Capital Adequacy: An Evidence from World Bank Survey(2019)
0
조회
0
다운로드
0
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
왜 어떤 나라의 금융시스템은 자본 적정성 유지를 통해 금융위기에 대한 면역력을 강화하는 반면, 다른 나라는 그렇지 못하여 금융 실패를 경험하는가? 본 연구는 세계은행의 데이터를 활용하여, 국제자본과 정부의 개입, 바젤레짐의 참여/준수가 160개국의 자본 적정성에 미치는 효과를 분석하였다. 첫째 외국계 자본이 일국 은행시스템의 총자산에서 차지하는 비율이높으면 자본 적정성은 향상된다. 둘째 엄격한 바젤협약에 가입할수록 레버리지 효과가 줄어들기 때문에 각국의 선택은 바젤협약의 최소 자본적정성 비율(10.5%)을 지키되 그 이상의 자본적정성의 여유분은 줄이는 경향이 있다. 셋째 일국 은행시스템에서 정부가 소유/통제하는 자산의 비율이 높을수록 자본 적정성이 증가한다.
Abstract
Why do some countries secure immunity to financial crises by rational risk and capital adequacy management while others do not thereby facing crises? Employing World Bank’s survey data, this study analyzed effects of foreign capital flow, governments’ financial involvement, and compliance to Basel Regime on capital adequacy ratios in 160 countries. The results showed as follows: 1) if foreign capital as percentage of banking systems’ total asset increases, capital adequacy ratio gets enhanced; 2) as compliance to more strict version of Basel Accords decreases benefits of leverage effect on the part of bankers, each country tends to choose to reduce capital adequacy ratios while keeping the minimum requirement(10.5%) imposed by the Basel Committee; 3) if a government’s share of total asset in banking sector increases, the capital adequacy gets improved.
참고문헌 (52)
- 김홍범, "금융감독: 이대론 안된다" (2002), 두남출판사
- Ahmed, Shaghil, "Capital Flows to Emerging Market Economics: A Brave New World?", Journal of International Money and Finance, 48(B), pp.221~248 (2014)
- Agoraki, Maria-Eleni K, "Regulations, Competition and Bank Risk-Taking in Transition Countries", Journal of Financial Stability, 7(1), pp.38~48 (2011)
- Allen, Franklin, "Competition and Financial Stability", Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 36(3), pp.453~481 (2004)
- "Bank Regulation and Supervision Ten Years After the Global Financial Crisis"[URL]
- Antony, Atellu, "The Role of Banking Concentration on Financial Stability", International Journal of Economics and Finance, 13(6), pp.103~117 (2021)
- Ayadi, Rym, "Does Basel Compliance Matter for Bank Performance?", Journal of Financial Stability, 23, pp.15~32 (2016)
- "Bank for International Settlement"[URL]
- Barth, James R., "Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels Govern" (2006), Cambridge University Press
- "Bank Concentration and Crises"[URL]
- "Law, Politics, and Finance"[URL]
- Blum, Jurg, "Do Captial Adequacy Requirements Reduce Risks in Banking?", Journal of Banking & Finance, 23(5), pp.755~771 (1999)
- "Is One Watchdog Better Than Three?: International Experience with Integrated Financial Sector Supervision"[URL]
- Chortareas, Georgios E, "Bank Supervision, Regulation, and Efficiency: Evidence from the European Union", Journal of Financial Stability, 8(4), pp.292~302 (2012)
- "The Link Between Adherence to International Standards of Good Practice, Foreign Exchanges Spreads, and Ratings"[URL]
- Cihak, Martin, "Bank Regulation and Supervision in the Context of the Global Crisis", Journal of Financial Stability, 9(4), pp.733~746 (2013)
- Claessens, Stijn, "Resolution of Financial Distress: An International Perspective on the Design of Bankruptcy Laws" (2001), World Bank
- "Quality of Financial Policies and Financial System Stress"[URL]
- Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, "Basel Core Principles and Bank Soundness: Does Compliance Matter?", Journal of Financial Stability, 7(4), pp.1179~190 (2011)
- Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, "Banking on The Principles:Compliance With Basel Core Principles and Bank Soundness", Journal of Financial Intermediation, 17(4), pp.511~542 (2008)
- Eichengreen, Barry, "The Asian Financial Crisis and the Architecture of Global Finance" (2000), Cambridge University Press
- Fries, Steven, "Cost Efficiency of Banks in Transition: Evidence from 289 Banks in 15 Post-Communist Countries", Journal of Banking and Finance, 29(1), pp.55~81 (2005)
- Gerschenkron, Alexander, "Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective" (1962), Havard University Press
- Gill, Stephen, "Globalization, Market Civilization, and Disciplinary Neoliberalism", Millennium:Journal of International Studies, 24(3), pp.399~423 (1995)
- Hay, Colin, "The Normalizing Role of Rationalist Assumptions in the Institutional Embedding of Neoliberalism", Economy and Society, 33(4), pp.500~527 (2006)
- Helleiner, Eric, "States and The Reemergence of Global Finance from Bretton Woods to The 1990s" (1994), Cornell University Press
- Hellman, Thomas, "Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Controls Enough?", American Economic Review, 90(1), pp.147~165 (2000)
- International Monetary Fund, "Emerging Market Financing", IMF, ~ (2001)
- Kahler, Miles, "Economic Crisis and Policy Choice" (1990), Princeton University Press
- Kaminsky, Graciela Laura, "Short-Run Pain, Long-Run Gain: Financial Liberalization and Stock Market Cycles", Review of Finance, 12(2), pp.253~292 (2008)
- "Basel Committee on Banking Supervision"[URL]
- Kroszner, Randall, "Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn’t" (2001), University of Chicago Press
- La Porta, Rafael, "Law and Finance", Journal of Political Economy, 106(6), pp.1113~1155 (1998)
- Mattli, Walter, "their The Politics of Global Regulation" (2009), Princeton University Press
- Maxfield, Sylvia, "Understanding the Political Implications of Financial Internationalization in Emerging Market Countries", World Development, 26(7), pp.1201~1217 (1998)
- Mili, Mehdi, "Determinants of the Capital Adequacy Ratio of Foreign Banks’ Subsidiaries: The Role of Interbank Market and Regulation", Research in International Business and Finance, 42, pp.442~453 (2017)
- Mishkin, Frederic S, "Financial Consolidation: Dangers and Opportunities", Journal of Banking and Finance, 23(2~4), pp.675~691 (1999)
- North, Douglass C, "Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance" (1990), Cambridge University Press
- Olson, Mancur, "The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and The Theory of Groups" (1965), Harvard University Press
- "Does Compliance With Basel Core Principles Bring Any Measurable Benefits?"[URL]
- Pigou, Arthur C, "The Economics of Welfare" (1938), Macmillan
- Roulet, Caroline, "Basel III: Effects of Capital and Liquidity Regulations on European Bank Lending", Journal of Economics and Business, 95, pp.26~46 (2018)
- Shleifer, Andrei, "The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies and Their Cures" (1998), Havard University Press
- Simmons, Beth A, "The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital Market Regulation", International Organization, 55(3), pp.589~620 (2001)
- Stiglitz, Joseph E, "Some Aspects of the Pure Theory of Corporate Finance: Bankruptcies and Takeovers", Bell Journal of Economics, 3(3), pp.458~482 (1972)
- Strange, Susan, "Casino Capitalism" (1986), Manchester University Press
- Thatcher, Mark, "Theory and Practices of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions", West European Politics, 25(1), pp.1~22 (2011)
- "Capital Flows and Financial Stability: Monetary Policy and Macroprudential Responses"[URL]
- Walter, Andrew, "Governing Finance : East Asia’s Adoption of International Standards" (2008), Cornell University Press
- Williamson, Stephen D, "Costly Monitoring, Financial Intermediation, and Equilibrium Credit Rationing", Journal of Monetary Economics, 18(2), pp.159~179 (1986)
- "Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey"[URL]
- "Worldwide Governance Indicators"[URL]
