군비통제 관점에서 본 남북 군사합의 평가

Abstract

This paper aims at evaluating the inter-Korean military agreement from an arms control perspective. To systematically evaluate, the periods were divided into three periods as “Arms Control 1.0” in the 1990s, “Arms Control 2.0” in the 2000s, and “Arms Control 3.0” in the 2010s. This paper also divided inter-Korean military agreements into three areas: a) military trust-building, b) operational arms control, and c) structural arms control. Based on this classification, this paper could confirm certain agreements related to arms control between the two Koreas and how the agreements were actually implemented. The issues that the North actively implemented, avoided and influential factors for each period and area were also examined. In conclusion, the agreements of Arms Control 1.0 were implemented not in the least. It is because North Korea avoided isolation in the international community and aimed at promoting the propaganda of disguised peace rather than implementing the agreements at that time. Arms Control 2.0 was partially implemented. The agreements of Arms Control 2.0 were dampening measures of South Korea’s military posture including economic profit such as the connection of rail and road, elimination of propaganda activity against North Korea and its measures that can threaten its regime and system, and neutralization of the NLL. North Korea showed similar behaviors regarding Arms Control 3.0. The North Korean nuclear issues limited economic benefits to the North, but it actively accepted suspending broadcasts against the North and removing loudspeakers, restricting airspace, and banning artillery fire that can weaken readiness posture in five West Sea islands and reconnaissance capabilities which South Korea is superior to. During this process, the North tried to take advantage of its own interests, temporarily responding to the pilot evacuation of the GP or building roads for joint recovery operations that the South has desired. But that was it. This paper concluded that even if North Korea actively implemented the agreements in its favor, it is not interested in the military trust-building or arms control to expect the North’s sincerity hardly. At the time of Arms Control 2.0, it was possible to push for a roundabout trust-building strategy through inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. Still, this strategy is almost impossible due to the advanced North Korean nuclear and missile capabilities and the higher level of sanctions against the North. This paper also confirmed that if there is no progress in the North Korean nuclear issues, there would be a limit to the development of inter-Korean relations and the military trust-building and arms control. Please refer to the strategies presented based on the analysis in this paper in the future.