深河戰役 당시 광해군의 ‘密旨’와 對後金 배후교섭의 변질

Abstract

This paper examines the vicissitude of Chosŏn's negotiations with the Later Jin on the context of the Campaign of Simha in 1619. During the campaign, Chosŏn dispatched troops to aid Donglujun (東路軍 ; Eastern Column Army) of the Ming, but after their defeat, Supreme Commander Kang Hongnip of Chosŏn surrendered to the Later Jin. Thereafter, this had a profound influence not only on the diplomatic relations between Chosŏn and the Ming, but also between Chosŏn and the Later Jin. However, the studies were concentrated on Kwanghaegun's "Secret Instruction (密旨)", which Kang was said to receive, while the role of Pibyŏnsa (備邊司 ; the Border Defense Council) and the interaction between Kwanghaegun and his ministers were not examined thoroughly. This paper attempted to show that the reason behind Chosŏn army stationed and marched behind the Ming Donglujun was related to the failsafe for Chosŏn’s Behind-the-Scenes negotiation with the Later Jin. In addition, this article argues that Kwanghaegun's lukewarm attitude toward Kang Hongnip's surrender and his punishment triggered his conflicts with the Border Defense Council, and at the same time, the negotiations with the later Jin lost their function as a ‘Loose-Rein Policy’, turning into "secret negotiations" as a result. This contemplates that Chosŏn’s foreign policy towards the Ming and the Later Jin was not the dilemma between the Ming or the Later Jin, but the ambivalence on each other.