덕 윤리의 현대적 의의

Abstract

Why does virtue ethics matter again in contemporary society? It seems to be that since modem age, duty ethics as a result of minimalizing and visualizing strategy in order to upgrade the moral determinacy is insufficient and unsatisfactory in our moral life. At first, one of the drawbacks of duty ethics is its over-reductionist tendency to symplifying the variety of our moral life or moral experiences to morally required obligations, and its over-empathizing on moral justification and not caring for moral motivation and moral practice. At last, modem moral philosophy, with its desire for explicit and univocal decision procedures, has stubbornly assumes that moral conflicts must be only apparent and there must be a monistic system of moral rules. In keeping with its rejection of the concept of moral duties, virtue ethics also downgrade the moral rules which prescribes how each person is to act. But what, then, is the caritria for virtue? On this basic question, virtue ehtics is confronted by a crucial difficulty, that besets any conception which does not base the virtues on moral rule for action. This difficulty is moral indeterminacy. Furthermore, if it is true that the system of ethical norms had a close relationship to their social structure, the attempt to revive virtue ethics in this post-in dustrial era implicitly points to the reconstruction of a new society. It seems to be that a society befitting virtue ethics is something simlar to small-scale local community. I think it is implausible project. Consequently, our main agument is that virtue ethics is not alternative but complementary of duty ethics. 목차 (Table of Contents)