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국방경비대ㆍ육군의 세력 분포와 숙군

The power distribution between Constabulary and R.O.K Army, and red purge

노영기
수선사학회|2009.06|사림 (SARIM, The Historical Journal)|제33호|pp. 263-291

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참고문헌

키워드

육군여순사건국방경비대숙군ConstabularyR.O.K ArmyYosun RebellionRed Purge
주제분류역사학

초록

A purge in the R.O.K Army establishment changed the nature of the Army. The Army could succeed in removing inside opponents and getting stability through performing the purge. It was possible for the Army to intervene some events outside the Army on the basis of its inner stability. The purge in the Army has gained even more importance than any other event that had been broken out during the Army establishment period. However, only one-way appraisals have been made on this issue as its researches have been mainly based on anti-communism. This study examines the background for the purge in the Army, its escalation process, and its actual development. The constabulary suffered varied changes inside in the days when it was transformed into the Army. The U.S. Army Military Government drove some members who might be counter force for the single government out of the constabulary, especially, as the characters of the constabulary came to change according to the political situation's variation. The red purge in the constabulary was continued after the R,O,K government foundation. Furthermore, the opponents of the R.O.K government was blocked to join the armed service after the government's establishment; the government completed measures to remove its opponents from the army. The Army recruited soldiers and rendered systemic measures for its inner stability. In addition, it expanded the range of red purge from the Army toward the whole force level. As a result, the direct backlash against the red purge after the establishment of the R.O.K government brought about its explosion, Yosun rebellion. The Army became to develop red purge inside indiscriminately. It was entirely different; it was qualitatively and quantitatively different as compared with the former purge. The range of the listed people who were supposed to be investigated was expanded in larger scale. The Investigation in the red purge came to cover on highest-level officers. The Information Bureau of the Headquarter of the Army and the Troop of Military Secrets took charge of practical things in the purge. The National Police that had collected information on the Army from the Army's Constabulary period cooperated with the red purge. The red purge performers in the Army used repressive measures to the suspected people in the investigation, like the confession under the torture. Consequently, the Army could remove not only the leftists inside but also the groups who were against Syngman Rhee, the president of the new government. The accused in the red purge in the Army were punished by the Defense Security Law. Sometimes some accused were released in the court for their innocence because their investigations were pushed unreasonably. Generally, the Army could drive some anti regime sides with the red purge. Therefore it could control its internal atmosphere quietly. Since then, the Army has been the measure to protect the regime of the South Korea on the basis of its internal stability.

Abstract

A purge in the R.O.K Army establishment changed the nature of the Army. The Army could succeed in removing inside opponents and getting stability through performing the purge. It was possible for the Army to intervene some events outside the Army on the basis of its inner stability. The purge in the Army has gained even more importance than any other event that had been broken out during the Army establishment period. However, only one-way appraisals have been made on this issue as its researches have been mainly based on anti-communism. This study examines the background for the purge in the Army, its escalation process, and its actual development. The constabulary suffered varied changes inside in the days when it was transformed into the Army. The U.S. Army Military Government drove some members who might be counter force for the single government out of the constabulary, especially, as the characters of the constabulary came to change according to the political situation's variation. The red purge in the constabulary was continued after the R,O,K government foundation. Furthermore, the opponents of the R.O.K government was blocked to join the armed service after the government's establishment; the government completed measures to remove its opponents from the army. The Army recruited soldiers and rendered systemic measures for its inner stability. In addition, it expanded the range of red purge from the Army toward the whole force level. As a result, the direct backlash against the red purge after the establishment of the R.O.K government brought about its explosion, Yosun rebellion. The Army became to develop red purge inside indiscriminately. It was entirely different; it was qualitatively and quantitatively different as compared with the former purge. The range of the listed people who were supposed to be investigated was expanded in larger scale. The Investigation in the red purge came to cover on highest-level officers. The Information Bureau of the Headquarter of the Army and the Troop of Military Secrets took charge of practical things in the purge. The National Police that had collected information on the Army from the Army's Constabulary period cooperated with the red purge. The red purge performers in the Army used repressive measures to the suspected people in the investigation, like the confession under the torture. Consequently, the Army could remove not only the leftists inside but also the groups who were against Syngman Rhee, the president of the new government. The accused in the red purge in the Army were punished by the Defense Security Law. Sometimes some accused were released in the court for their innocence because their investigations were pushed unreasonably. Generally, the Army could drive some anti regime sides with the red purge. Therefore it could control its internal atmosphere quietly. Since then, the Army has been the measure to protect the regime of the South Korea on the basis of its internal stability.

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