이름의 논리: 실재론 비판

Abstract

In order to understand the phenomenon of a proper name, it suffices to record the phenomenon of a rule for the use of a sign. And a fortiori there is no need for the present day popular “possible world” talk. Some - albeit not all - rules for the use of a sign are accountable to nothing but themselves, and they project a dead sign onto the world. It is these projective rules that there were at the beginning, not so-called “things.” The so-called “objects” are signs in their projective relation to the world. We might call this “Rule Ontology.” The alleged “consciousness” or “mind” that is supposed to instill life to a dead by itself sign is nothing but language. At the beginning there was a word, not the “consciousness.” The so-called “mind” is either something without interest for philosophy or it is our language in its intentional activity, which is in turn a matter of rules of the aforementioned sort. In this way, our philosophy has bypassed the so-called “reality” and the so-called “mind” and settled with language as a system of arbitrary rules in the sense as explained above. We might call this “Linguistic Philosophy.”