제2차 세계대전 시기 붉은 군대 전투 역량의 실상과 허상
An Estimation of the Red Army’s Military Performance in the Second World War
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이 글의 목적은 제2차 세계대전 시기 소련군의 군사작전 수준과 전투 역량의 실상을 밝히는 것이다. 소련군을 양적 우세로 질적 열세를 상쇄했던 “오합지졸”로 여기는 편견은 소련의 군사학 수준과 소련군 군사작전의 구체적 실태에 관한 무지에서 비롯되었다. 마르크스주의에 입각해서 제1차 세계대전과 내전에서 얻은 교훈을 연구한 붉은 군대는 혁신적인 군사이론 체계를 확립했다. 전간기에 소련의 군사 이론가들은 종심작전 개념과 세계 최초의 작전술 개념을 개발했다. 독소전쟁 전반기에 수세에 몰렸던 소련군은 전쟁 중후반부터는 전쟁의 주도권을 쥐고 실전에서 매우 정교한 작전을 구사하면서 적군을 압도했다. 소련군은 작전 준비 단계에서 적 방어진지에 관한 정보를 수집해서 취약점을 파악하고 적 방어 형태에 따라 작전술적 수준의 공격 제파를 조절해서 배치했고 기만책을 사용해서 공격 기도를 숨겼다. 소련군은 적군의 취약 지점을 주공 축선으로 삼아 그 축선에 병력을 집중했다. 공격이 개시되면 제1제파인 제병협동군이 돌파구를 형성하고 제2제파인 기동집단이 작전술적 수준의 전과확대를 시작해서 적군을 포위하고 섬멸했다. 공격에 대규모 병력을 투입하는 소련군의 특성은 양적 우세로 질적 열세를 상쇄하려는 몸부림에 지나지 않다고 여겨졌지만, 그 특성은 단순히 질적 열세의 산물이 아니라 대병력의 투입을 합리적 방법으로 여기는 소련군 군사사상의 결과였다. 소련군은 여단급 선견대의 투입을 통한 기동 작전, 돌격조와 돌격집단의 편성을 통한 적 요새의 돌파, 대전차 방어의 극복을 위한 각종 전법 등 전술적 수준에서도 다양한 방법을 구사했다. 이렇듯 소련군은 고유한 군사학 이론에 기반을 두고 수립된 치밀한 군사작전을 정교한 전투 기법으로 실행하는 역량을 지녔기에 제2차 세계대전에서 독일군을 압도하고 승리할 수 있었다.
Abstract
This article aims to estimate the Soviet army’s capacities for military operations by its performance in the Second World War. The ignorance of the Soviet army’s military performance predicated on the Soviet military science led to the strong bias that the Soviet Army was nothing more than just the big-sized armed forces which could be characterized by its tendency to counterbalance the inferiority in quality with the superiority in number on the battlefields. The Red army renovated the military theories on the basis of both Marxism, the official ideology of the Soviet Union, and the lessons extracted from the experiences of the First World War and the ensuing Civil War. During the interwar period a number of the Soviet military scientists developed the deep battle theory as well as the idea of operational art. At the initial stage of the German-Soviet War the Red Army very nearly lost the war. From the winter of 1942-1943 onwards, however, it made a reversal and held the initiative in the war by unfolding the excellent military operations against the Wehrmacht. The capacity to plan and implement the detailed military operations led the Red Army to overwhelm its enemy on the battlefields. At the preparatory stage of each operation the Red Army collected the intelligence on the enemy’s defensive positions to grasp their weak points and arranged the coordinated echelon attacks on the level of operational art. Before the launch of the operations the operational deceptions were carried out successfully to conceal the intention to attack. The Soviet army had a tendency to select the poorly defended area of the enemy as a main axis of attack and focus its military strength on the axis. Once the operation was launched, the first echelon of the combined arms unit breached the enemy’s defensive lines and then the second echelon of the maneuvering formations conducted the exploitation on the level of operational art for the encirclement and destruction of the enemy. It has been conventionally argued that the Soviet army always showed a tendency to put as many troops as possible into assaults in an effort to counterbalance its inferiority in quality with the superiority in number. However, such a tendency was not so much a result of its inferiority in quality as an outcome of the basic Soviet military idea that the massive troops could be a rational means to defeat an enemy. In order to overcome the enemy defenses the Soviet army resorted to various tactics such as the brigade-sized forward detachments(peredovye otriady) for maneuvering operations, the formation of assault detachments or assault groups for the breakthrough of a strongly fortified enemy defensive zone, the neutralization of enemy’s anti-tank defenses and so on. The superiority in number does not guarantee victory automatically in war. In the German-Soviet War the Soviet army was in a position to defeat the German army and won the ultimate victory, since it had a capacity to plan the detailed military operations and carry them into effect on battlefields.
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