칸트의 『도덕형이상학 정초』 3장에서의 연역 구조
The Structure of Kant’s Deduction of the Moral Law in the Groundwork III
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이 논문은 칸트가 연역을 통해 수행한 도덕법칙에 대한 옹호(vindication)를 정교화하고, 그것의 장단점을 논의한다. 확실히 칸트가 보여주고자 한 것은 인간처럼 감성적이면서 이성적인 존재자들이 도덕적으로 정당화될 수 있다는 것, 그러한 존재자로서 정언명령에 종속된다는 것이다. 직접적으로 명백하지 않은 것은 이러한 정당화의 정확한 본성이다. 최고 도덕 원리에는 어떠한 종류의 정당화가 주어질 수 있는가? 도덕법칙에 대한 우리의 종속을 경험을 통해 정당화하려는 모든 시도는 결함이 있을 것이다. 『정초』 3장, 특별히 그 장의 후반부를 주의 깊게 독해해 보면, 놀랍게도 여기서 칸트의 연역이 두 단계로 진행되고 있음을 알게 된다. 혹은 차라리 그가 연역을 두 개의 서로 다른 실천 영역들, 즉 도덕형이상학과 순수실천이성비판에서 시도함에 따라 두 개의 연역 개념을 작동시키고 있음이 드러난다고 할 수 있다. 따라서 나는 이것들 각각을 “두터운” 연역 개념과 “얇은” 연역 개념이라고 부른다. 나의 분석이 옳다면, 칸트는 먼저 도덕형이상학처럼 보이는 것의 작업틀 내에서 강한 연역을 고려하고, 심각한 결함– 모종의 순환 –을 발견한 (혹은 노출시킨) 후에, 재빨리 그것을 교정하여, 그 대신에 유의미하게 더 약한 연역을 제공한다. 순수실천이성비판으로의 이행은, 그의 초월적 관념론에 의지하여 이러한 결함을 극복하기 위해 요구된다. 그 경우 도덕성은 도덕형이상학에 의해 생각된 것과 같은 강한 정당화를 제공받을 수 없다. 순수실천이성비판에서는 오직 약한 정당화만이 실행 가능하다.
Abstract
This paper elaborates Kant’s vindication of the moral law in terms of its deduction, and discusses its merits and defects. What Kant now exactly wants to show is that sensible rational beings such as humans are justifiably moral and, as such, subject to the categorical imperative. What is not immediately obvious is the exact nature of this justification. What kind of justification can be given to the supreme moral principle? Any attempt to justify our subjection to the moral law by means of experience would be defective. A careful reading of G III, especially its second half, surprisingly reveals that Kant’s deduction here proceeds in two stages or rather he is operating with two conceptions of deduction according as it is attempted in two different practical fields, viz., a metaphysics of morals and a critique of pure practical reason. Accordingly, I call these “a thick” and “a thin conception” of deduction, respectively. If my analysis is correct, Kant first considers a strong deduction within the framework of what appears to be a metaphysic of morals, and after discovering (or exposing) a serious defect – a circle of some sort – he quickly remedies it and offers a significantly weaker one instead. The transition to a critique of pure practical reason is required in order to overcome this defect by way of a recourse to his transcendental idealism. Morality then cannot be given a strong justification as conceived by the metaphysic of morals. Only a weak justification is feasible in a critique of pure practical reason.
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