철학상담의 정체성과 심리상담의 오해

Abstract

In this article, I reply to the Oc-Jean Kim’s criticism and give a possible reason for her misunderstanding and for why philosophical counseling cannot be a subfield of psychological counseling. I also propose my opinion on the relationship between them. For these, in section 2, I answer to her criticism on counselee's autonomy and non-directiveness. I show that Welfel and Patterson's six principles and Chungki Kim and Bounkyu Kang's seven principles as evidences for non-directiveness of psychological counseling are not sufficient for meaning non-directiveness and that non-directiveness cannot be understood as counselee's autonomy. I also emphasize that non-directiveness is not an essential difference between them. In section three, I answer her four criticisms on the limit and contradiction of philosophical counseling: 1) on her criticism that therapy is used as an ordinary meaning and that there are various and developing positions on its usages, I point out that these words are still interchangeably used, that she did not answer my criticism of their not being strictly distinguished from each other and that she did not explain the contents of its ordinary meaning. 2) on her assertion of cautious use of psychological test and of the necessity of a new definition of philosophical counseling, I point out the possible blind faith of counselee and her lack of understanding the history of philosophical counseling. I also show that she did not say anything on the directive practice of psychological counseling such as diagnosis and prescription of mental disorders. 3) On her criticism that psychological counseling also involves in quest for reason and that I am stuck in Platonic intellectualistic idealism, I answer that the former is not related to the essential difference and that the latter is nothing but the fallacy of straw man. 4) on her criticism that difficulty of definition, poor activity of philosophical counseling and long history of philosophy discourage the possibility and necessity of independence of philosophical counseling, I suggest the confusion of the declaration of independence with its completion, the relationship between activity and independence, and superficial consideration. In section 4, I suggest the cause of her misunderstanding, the reason for the impossible dependence, and ideal relationship between philosophical counseling and psychological counseling. I hold that her misunderstanding is originated from confusion of psycho-counseling with psychological counseling and of philosophical counseling with counseling on the philosophical level, that the different genus proximum of philosophical counseling, the unclear concept of psychological counseling, and its use of prescriptive model discourage the subordinate relationship as she suggests, and that I disagree on Achenbach's assertion in which the core lies not in distinction between division of labor and collaboration but in dialectical/non-dialectical relationship between two counseling.