On Brentano's Treatment of Objectless Representation
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Quite a few philosophers, explicitly or implicitly, accept a certain particular picture of Franz Brentano's treatment of objectless representation. It includes the view that Brentano's notion of intentional inexistence is regarded as the proper solution to the philosophical puzzle just mentioned. The solution can be, briefly yet essentially, put as follows: When we think about a non-existent entity such as Santa Claus, we have in our mind a special, ephemeral, mental representation that stands for the entity in question; and mental representation of the sort makes objectless representation possible. This interpretation is chiefly due to R. Chisholm, and it has been considered to be "standard". To some extent, the received view about Brentano's idea of objectless representation is plausible and tenable. But can it be the historically correct exposition? To this question, some scholars of Brentano are inclined to say "no". That is not to underrate Chisholm's way of understanding Brentano's ideas. Yet recent studies reveal that in the traditional approaches to understanding Brentano's philosophy, there have been some grave misunderstandings. While paying attention to the new research perspective on Brentano, in the present paper I argue that the plausibility of the received interpretation about Brentano's treatment of objectless representation seriously weakens when we properly appreciate the point that Brentano's doctrine of intentional inexistence is designed to treat not only objectless representation but also objectival representation in general, including the problem as to how it is possible for us to represent existing entities in the world. The paper consists of some explication and defence of this claim.
Abstract
Quite a few philosophers, explicitly or implicitly, accept a certain particular picture of Franz Brentano's treatment of objectless representation. It includes the view that Brentano's notion of intentional inexistence is regarded as the proper solution to the philosophical puzzle just mentioned. The solution can be, briefly yet essentially, put as follows: When we think about a non-existent entity such as Santa Claus, we have in our mind a special, ephemeral, mental representation that stands for the entity in question; and mental representation of the sort makes objectless representation possible. This interpretation is chiefly due to R. Chisholm, and it has been considered to be "standard". To some extent, the received view about Brentano's idea of objectless representation is plausible and tenable. But can it be the historically correct exposition? To this question, some scholars of Brentano are inclined to say "no". That is not to underrate Chisholm's way of understanding Brentano's ideas. Yet recent studies reveal that in the traditional approaches to understanding Brentano's philosophy, there have been some grave misunderstandings. While paying attention to the new research perspective on Brentano, in the present paper I argue that the plausibility of the received interpretation about Brentano's treatment of objectless representation seriously weakens when we properly appreciate the point that Brentano's doctrine of intentional inexistence is designed to treat not only objectless representation but also objectival representation in general, including the problem as to how it is possible for us to represent existing entities in the world. The paper consists of some explication and defence of this claim.
참고문헌 (19)
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