Phenomenal Externalism and Perceptual Appearances
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Phenomenal externalism has it that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can be constitutively determined by things external to the perceiving subject. Although many contemporary philosophers of perception endorse such view, there is no consensus on the nature of the mind-independent properties that purport to determine the way things perceptually appear to the subject. In this paper, I will critically examine two views of appearance properties: (1) the parsimonious view and (2) the extravagant view. These views are intended to capture how things perceptually appear to the subject with their novel accounts of appearance properties, but both of them face some serious problems. At the end, I propose an extravagant view that is immune to these problems.
Abstract
Phenomenal externalism has it that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can be constitutively determined by things external to the perceiving subject. Although many contemporary philosophers of perception endorse such view, there is no consensus on the nature of the mind-independent properties that purport to determine the way things perceptually appear to the subject. In this paper, I will critically examine two views of appearance properties: (1) the parsimonious view and (2) the extravagant view. These views are intended to capture how things perceptually appear to the subject with their novel accounts of appearance properties, but both of them face some serious problems. At the end, I propose an extravagant view that is immune to these problems.
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