Perceptual Objects and Phenomenal Properties
0
조회
0
다운로드
0
인용
0
참고문헌
키워드
초록
There are at least two distinct ways to think about visual experience. First, one might simply ask what kind of mental state a visual experience is. This line of thinking concerns the fundamental nature of visual experience, and what it amounts to being perceptually related to the external world. However, there is a more specific way to think about visual experience, that is, how the world visually appears to an ordinary perceiver, or put it more succinctly, its phenomenology. Two major views of visual phenomenology have been proposed, but many of the authors in the debate assume, one way or another, that visual phenomenology can be constitutively determined by both objects and their properties. In this paper, however, I argue that this common assumption about the constitutive nature of visual phenomenology is false. In particular, I argue for the property view, which has it that only properties are its phenomenal constituents. The property view, however, implies a crucial difference between object and property perception because, given the view, only our perceptual relation to properties is phenomenally efficacious. I thus supplement this view with a novel account of object perception and its phenomenal impotence.
Abstract
There are at least two distinct ways to think about visual experience. First, one might simply ask what kind of mental state a visual experience is. This line of thinking concerns the fundamental nature of visual experience, and what it amounts to being perceptually related to the external world. However, there is a more specific way to think about visual experience, that is, how the world visually appears to an ordinary perceiver, or put it more succinctly, its phenomenology. Two major views of visual phenomenology have been proposed, but many of the authors in the debate assume, one way or another, that visual phenomenology can be constitutively determined by both objects and their properties. In this paper, however, I argue that this common assumption about the constitutive nature of visual phenomenology is false. In particular, I argue for the property view, which has it that only properties are its phenomenal constituents. The property view, however, implies a crucial difference between object and property perception because, given the view, only our perceptual relation to properties is phenomenally efficacious. I thus supplement this view with a novel account of object perception and its phenomenal impotence.
참고문헌 (44)
- Block, Ned, "On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness", Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18(2), pp.227~287 (1995)
- Brewer, Bill, "Perception and Content", European Journal of Philosophy, 14(2), pp.165~181 (2006)
- Brewer, Bill, "Perception and Its Objects" (2011), Oxford University Press
- Byrne, Alex, "Intentionalism Defended", The Philosophical Review, 110(2), pp.199~240 (2001)
- Byrne, Alex, "Experience and Content", The Philosophical Quarterly, 59(236), pp.429~451 (2009)
- Campbell, John, "Reference and Consciousness" (2002), Oxford University Press
- Chalmers, David, "The Character of Consciousness" (2010), Oxford University Press
- Chisholm, Roderik, "The Problem of the Speckled Hen", Mind, 51(204), pp.368~373 (1942)
- Clark, Austen, "A Theory of Sentience" (2000), Oxford University Press
- Clark, Austen, "Feature-Placing and Proto-Objects", Philosophical Psychology, 17(4), pp.451~477 (2004)
- Davies, Martin, "Perceptual Content and Local Supervenience", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 92, pp.21~45 (1992)
- Fish, William, "Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion" (2009), Oxford University Press
- French, Craig, "On the Particularity of Experience", Philosophical Studies, 173(2), pp.451~460 (2016)
- Ganson, Todd, "On the Generality of Experience: A Reply to French and Gomes", Philosophical Studies, 173(12), pp.3223~3229 (2016)
- Genone, James, "Appearance and Illusion", Mind, 123(490), pp.339~376 (2014)
- Green, E. J., "What is an Object File?", British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
- Green, E. J., "A Theory of Perceptual Objects", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Hill, Christopher, "Consciousness" (2009), Cambridge University Press
- Jackson, Frank, "Perception: A Representative Theory" (1977), Cambridge University Press
- Logue, Heather, "Why Naïve Realism?", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 112(part 2), pp.211~237 (2012)
- Lormand, Eric, "Nonphenomenal Consciousness", Noûs, 30(2), pp.242~261 (1996)
- Lycan, William, "Consciousness and Experience" (1996), MIT Press
- Martin, M. G. F., "The Transparency of Experience", Mind & Language, 17(4), pp.376~425 (2002)
- Martin, M. G. F, "The Limits of Self-Awareness", Philosophical Studies, 120(1, pp.3) (2004), 37~89
- Matthen, Mohan, "Features, Places, and Things: Reflections on Austen Clark’s Theory of Sentience", Philosophical Psychology, 17(4), pp.497~518 (2004)
- Mehta, Neil, "The Limited Role of Particulars in Phenomenal Experience", The Journal of Philosophy, 111(6), pp.311~331 (2014)
- Morgan, Jonathan, "Naïve Realism and Phenomenal Overlap", Philosophical Studies, 174(5), pp.1243~1253 (2017)
- O’Callaghan, Casey, "Object Perception: Vision and Audition", Philosophy Compass, 3(4), pp.803~829 (2008)
- Pace, Michael, "Foundationally Justified Perceptual Beliefs and the Problem of the Speckled Hen", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 91(3), pp.401~441 (2010)
- Pautz, Adam, "Intentionalism and Perceptual Presence", Philosophical Perspectives, 21(1), pp.495~541 (2007)
- Pautz, Adam, "What are the Contents of Experiences?", The Philosophical Quarterly, 59(236), pp.483~507 (2009)
- Quinlan, Philip T., "Visual Feature Integration Theory: Past, Present, and Future", Psychological Bulletin, 129(5), pp.643~673 (2003)
- Schellenberg, Susanna, "Ontological Minimalism about Phenomenology", Philosophy and Phenomenal Research, 83(1), pp.1~40 (2011)
- Schellenberg, Susanna, "Perceptual Particularity", Philosophy and Phenomenal Research, 93(1), pp.25~54 (2016)
- Schellenberg, Susanna, "The Unity of Perception" (2018), Oxford University Press
- Siegel, Susanna, "A Theory of Sentience by Austen Clark", The Philosophical Review, 111(1), pp.135~138 (2002)
- Siegel, Susanna, "The Contents of Visual Experience" (2010), Oxford University Press
- Speaks, Jeff, "Transparency, Intentionalism, and the Nature of Perceptual Content", Philosophy and Phenomenal Research, 79(3), pp.539~573 (2009)
- Spelke, Elizabeth S, "Principles of Object Perception", Cognitive Science, 14(1), pp.29~56 (1990)
- Travis, Charles, "The Silence of the Senses", Mind, 113(449), pp.57~94 (2004)
- Treisman, Anne, "A Feature Integration Theory of Attention", Cognitive Psychology, 12(1), pp.97~136 (1980)
- Kahneman, Daniel, "The Reviewing of Object Files: Object-Specific Integration of Information", Cognitive Psychology, 24(2), pp.175~219 (1992)
- Wu, Wayne, "The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy"
- Zenon, Pylyshyn, "Things and Places" (2011), MIT Press