Kant’s Nonconceptualism and the Transcendental Deduction
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In this paper, I defend the thesis that a nonconceptualist reading of Kant is compatible with the transcendental deduction. First of all, I will introduce what the upshot of the nonconceptualist reading is by looking at McDowell’s strong version of the conceptualism. Many conceptualist readers think that even if McDowell is mistaken, nonconceptualists have to show how the transcendental deduction fits with their reading. This is because the deduction chapter seems to be a major obstacle to nonconceptualism in that it demonstrates that every intuition depends on the act of the understanding. Contrary to conceptualism’s critique, I will argue that, when closely reading key passages in the deduction chapter, the transcendental deduction can accommodate nonconceptualist readings. I will especially focus on the notion of unity and space. While I cannot fully defend nonconceptualist readings here, my discussion will show that conceptualists should offer something more in order to prove that nonconceptualism is wrong.
Abstract
In this paper, I defend the thesis that a nonconceptualist reading of Kant is compatible with the transcendental deduction. First of all, I will introduce what the upshot of the nonconceptualist reading is by looking at McDowell’s strong version of the conceptualism. Many conceptualist readers think that even if McDowell is mistaken, nonconceptualists have to show how the transcendental deduction fits with their reading. This is because the deduction chapter seems to be a major obstacle to nonconceptualism in that it demonstrates that every intuition depends on the act of the understanding. Contrary to conceptualism’s critique, I will argue that, when closely reading key passages in the deduction chapter, the transcendental deduction can accommodate nonconceptualist readings. I will especially focus on the notion of unity and space. While I cannot fully defend nonconceptualist readings here, my discussion will show that conceptualists should offer something more in order to prove that nonconceptualism is wrong.
참고문헌 (11)
- Connolly, K., "Which Kantian Conceptualism (Or Nonconceptualism)?", The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 52(3), pp.316~337 (2014)
- Kant, I., "Critique of Pure Reason" (1998), Cambridge University Press
- Hanna, R., "Kant and Nonconceptual Content", European Journal of Philosophy, 13(2), pp.247~290 (2005)
- Hanna, R., "Kantian Non-conceptualism", Philosophical Studies, 137(1), pp.41~64 (2008)
- Land, T., "Nonconceptualist Readings of Kant and the Transcendental Deduction", Kantian Review, 20(1), pp.25~51 (2015)
- Longuenesse, Béatrice, "The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy" (2006), Cambridge University Press
- Longuenesse, Béatrice, "Kant and the Capacity to Judge" (1998), Princeton University Press
- McDowell, J, "Mind and World: With a New Introduction" (1996), Harvard University Press
- McLear, C., "The Kantian(Non)-conceptualism Debate", Philosophy Compass, 9(11), pp.769~790 (2014)
- Pereira, R., "A Nonconceptualist Reading of the B-Deduction", Philosophical Studies, 174, pp.425~442 (2017)
- Tolley, C., "The Non-Conceptuality of the Content of Intuitions : A New Approach", Kantian Review, 18(1), pp.107~136 (2013)