Explaining the Long-Delayed Defense Reform in South Korea
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This study explains why defense reform efforts in South Korea have failed to achieve substantial progress. The outcome would seem all the more unexpected because the Blue House has ostensibly wanted comprehensive defense reform, while the Korean military is also highly motivated to upgrade itself to be able to fight and defend itself against North Korea, which has continuously threatened to use nuclear weapons preemptively. How should we account for this puzzle? This study focuses on three factors to explain the absence of reform: the role of the president, the opposition from the armed forces leadership, and lapses in the civilian control of the military. This study concludes that South Korea needs to revitalize the reform process in order to successfully confront the security challenges of the twenty-first century. Defense reform has long been dominated by the military leaders. It has resulted in the unwanted situation where civilian leaders have been alienated. Ironically, lack of interest among civilian leaders leads to the lack of support from outside. In order to achieve successful defense reform, assistance from the outside must be guaranteed. South Korea needs to readjust goals and prepare for building robust armed forces to play a decisive role in achieving the mission to meet the requirements of changing strategic environments. The Park administration also needs to take timely steps to overcome its own vulnerabilities, such as modifying its doctrine, equipment, training, and culture. Elimination of its vulnerabilities may involve changes in philosophy, tactics and possibly even modifications to the concepts of operations. All can entail substantial costs. However, the cost of not dealing with the threats is likely to be much higher.
Abstract
This study explains why defense reform efforts in South Korea have failed to achieve substantial progress. The outcome would seem all the more unexpected because the Blue House has ostensibly wanted comprehensive defense reform, while the Korean military is also highly motivated to upgrade itself to be able to fight and defend itself against North Korea, which has continuously threatened to use nuclear weapons preemptively. How should we account for this puzzle? This study focuses on three factors to explain the absence of reform: the role of the president, the opposition from the armed forces leadership, and lapses in the civilian control of the military. This study concludes that South Korea needs to revitalize the reform process in order to successfully confront the security challenges of the twenty-first century. Defense reform has long been dominated by the military leaders. It has resulted in the unwanted situation where civilian leaders have been alienated. Ironically, lack of interest among civilian leaders leads to the lack of support from outside. In order to achieve successful defense reform, assistance from the outside must be guaranteed. South Korea needs to readjust goals and prepare for building robust armed forces to play a decisive role in achieving the mission to meet the requirements of changing strategic environments. The Park administration also needs to take timely steps to overcome its own vulnerabilities, such as modifying its doctrine, equipment, training, and culture. Elimination of its vulnerabilities may involve changes in philosophy, tactics and possibly even modifications to the concepts of operations. All can entail substantial costs. However, the cost of not dealing with the threats is likely to be much higher.
참고문헌 (26)
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