An Analysis and Lessons on South Korea’s Attempt and Postponement of the OPCON Transition from the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command
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This paper examines the relevance of logics for transferring Operational Controlauthority (OPCON) from the CFC (ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command) anddraws several lessons for South Korea in order not to repeat the same mistakes. For this purpose, it explains the background of OPCON and compares the logicswith the reality unfolded so far. The political leaders in the Roh administration pursued transition of OPCON in thename of sovereignty in 2003. However, OPCON authority is nothing but a tool toensure the unity of command in military operations and it is not regarded as aninfringement on sovereignty. The Roh administration promised to strengthenSouth Korean forces to lead the defense of South Korea through comprehensivedefense reform efforts, but failed to accomplish them. Though they expected threatsfrom North Korea would diminish gradually to be favorable to the transition, NorthKorea appears to have succeeded in developing several nuclear weapons. As a lesson, South Korea should understand that most countries in the world donot consider the delegation of OPCON as an infringement of national sovereignty. South Korea should focus on defense preparedness against the North Korean nuclearthreat by making the CFC the key player for the combined nuclear deterrence. Inthe long run, South Korea should speed up its defense reform efforts in order totake a leading role in the combined defense posture with the U.S. forces and tryto reflect people’s yearning for self-reliance. At the same time, the ROK and theUnited States should try to adopt measures that could ease South Korean people’sdemand for self-reliance within the current CFC structure.
Abstract
This paper examines the relevance of logics for transferring Operational Controlauthority (OPCON) from the CFC (ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command) anddraws several lessons for South Korea in order not to repeat the same mistakes. For this purpose, it explains the background of OPCON and compares the logicswith the reality unfolded so far. The political leaders in the Roh administration pursued transition of OPCON in thename of sovereignty in 2003. However, OPCON authority is nothing but a tool toensure the unity of command in military operations and it is not regarded as aninfringement on sovereignty. The Roh administration promised to strengthenSouth Korean forces to lead the defense of South Korea through comprehensivedefense reform efforts, but failed to accomplish them. Though they expected threatsfrom North Korea would diminish gradually to be favorable to the transition, NorthKorea appears to have succeeded in developing several nuclear weapons. As a lesson, South Korea should understand that most countries in the world donot consider the delegation of OPCON as an infringement of national sovereignty. South Korea should focus on defense preparedness against the North Korean nuclearthreat by making the CFC the key player for the combined nuclear deterrence. Inthe long run, South Korea should speed up its defense reform efforts in order totake a leading role in the combined defense posture with the U.S. forces and tryto reflect people’s yearning for self-reliance. At the same time, the ROK and theUnited States should try to adopt measures that could ease South Korean people’sdemand for self-reliance within the current CFC structure.
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