中国关联交易司法审查制度的变迁与展望
The Transition and Prospect of Judicial Review of Interested Transactions in China
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在立法层面,中国公司法上的关联交易规则存在审查标准不明、审查 内容不明、各审查要素所占权重不明的问题. 通过实证分析可知,在司法 实践中,不同法院或尊重公司自治,或注重交易对价公允,并相应以信 息披露及交易程序、是否满足商业逻辑、对价、价格等为审查内容,有 的法院仅审查交易程序或交易实质要素,有的法院兼顾二者. 部分法院还 创设了关联交易审查的举证责任倒置规则. 2021年12月公布的《公司法》 第六次修改草案区分了控股股东、实际控制人从事的关联交易和董事、 高管从事的关联交易,但并未完全吸纳司法解释对审查标准的规定,关 联交易的司法审查规则仍残缺. 考虑到立法的不足和实践中的需要,今后 的《公司法》修改应主要注重配套的事前程序的完善、举证责任倒置规 则的设计、司法审查标准的明确这三个方面.
Abstract
Chinese Corporation Act doesn’t have a complete system of rules for interested transactions. The main rule to make sure that the transaction is fair and the interest of company is protected is the judicial review rule focusing on whether the interest of company is impaired. However, the judicial review rule doesn’t provide the standard of review, the contents of review and the position of different elements of the interested transaction.Based on analysis of the cases, different courts treat interested transactions differently: some value the autonomy of the company while some value the intrinsic fairness of the transaction; accordingly, they take procedures, information disclosure, business judgment, consideration and price as the contents of review; and some take both procedural and substantial elements into consideration, some only look at one aspect. Also, some courts invented the special burden of proof rule for interested transaction. The draft of Corporation Act differentiates the interested transaction conducted by controlling shareholder and actual controlling person with the one conducted by director and officer and doesn’t take how the Explanation of the Corporation Act stipulated about the review made by the People’s Supreme Court of China. Hence, there is still no specific review rule for the interested transaction. Considering the deficiency of the draft and the need in practice, the revision of the Corporation Act in the future may focus on matched ex ante procedural rules, special burden of proof rule and elaborate standard of review in the aspects of judicial review rule for interested transaction.
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