퇴계 이황과 아담 스미스의 감정론 비교연구

Abstract

Toegye and Smith were scholars who acknowledged that morality originates not from reason but from emotion. However, their conceptions of reason differed. Smith viewed reason as humanity's capacity for calculation or emotional regulation, while Toegye saw it as the vitality inherent in all things. Despite this difference, both believed that humans and nature operate within systematic laws. Smith identified self-interest as the system's essence, whereas Toegye saw it as vitality and goodness. These differing views on reason and worldview shaped their perspectives on the scope of emotions. Smith focused primarily on general emotions arising from the seven passions (chiljeong), making them the core of his research. In contrast, Toegye distinguished between the pure, virtuous emotions of the four beginnings (sadan) and the potentially harmful emotions of the seven passions, emphasizing the importance of recognizing and differentiating between the two. Smith equated justice with the protection of self-interest, whereas Toegye warned that unchecked self-interest could lead to catastrophic consequences, comparing its effects to the collapse of mountains or tsunamis in the sea. Smith sought morality not in rigorous self-cultivation but in everyday emotions, considering what is practically beneficial as morally right. Toegye, however, sought morality in the recognition of the li—an empty, ethereal principle uniting self and others—and believed that what is morally right is inherently good. This paper aims to explore how the two thinkers used the concept of emotions (gamjeong) to express vastly different categories and manifestations, highlighting their contrasting approaches to morality and human nature.