표준감사시간제도에 대한 회계정보 제공자의 인식 : 코스닥 상장기업 회계담당자를 대상으로

Abstract

[Purpose]The standard audit hour policy aims to ensure adequate audit hours that auditors must invest in order to secure audit quality. The introduction of standard audit hour policy dramatically increases audit hours and accordingly the audit fees. We analyze survey responses from corporate accounting officers to investigate the costs and benefits of standard audit hour policy. [Methodology]This study conducted a survey of accounting managers in the KOSDAQ－listed firms, and analyze the costs and benefits of new policy recognized by the accounting information providers. [Findings]We find that 78 percent of survey respondents state that the current standard audit hours policy needs to be improved urgently. Specifically, corporate accounting officers respond that factors such as (1) the expertise of the current accounting department personnel, (2) the number of current accounting department personnel, (3) the auditor tenure, and (4) the degree of differences between the pre－ and post－audit financial statements should be reflected in the determination of standard audit hours. We also find that only 20 percent of respondents state the credibility of financial statements has been improved in the post－standard audit hours policy period. In－depth interviews with corporate accounting officers reveal that accounting information providers believe that the increase of audit hours in the post－standard audit hours policy period is the result of simple application of audit hours in the new policy. [Implications]From a social point of view, it is important to ensure the reliability of accounting information which has public property characteristic. However, if the incremental costs of a new policy are greater than the incremental benefits for the whole society, then we should reconsider the legitimacy of the new policy. While the audit hours should be decreased as the auditor’s understanding of the business and industry increases, the current standard audit hours policy does not fully reflect auditor tenure and the resulting audit efficiency.