주식기준보상유형이 재무보고의 질에 미치는 영향
The Effect of Stock－Based Compensation on the Financial Reporting Quality
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[연구목적]본 연구는 중국상장기업을 대상으로 경영자에 대한 주식기준보상유형을 스톡옵션과 양도제한조건부주식(RSU: restricted stock unit)으로 구분하고 보상유형에 따라 기업의 이익조정행태가 달라지는지를 실증분석하는데 목적이 있다. [연구방법]본 연구는 2012년부터 2021년까지 중국상장기업을 대상으로 주식기준보상이 이익조정에 미치는 영향을 분석하기 위하여 주식기준보상은 스톡옵션과 양도제한조건부주식으로 구분하고, 이익조정행위는 발생액이익조정과 실제이익조정으로 구분하여 실증분석을 수행하였다. [연구결과]스톡옵션을 부여한 경우 발생액이익조정에 유의한 영향을 미치지 않았으나 양도제한조건부 주식은 발생액이익조정과 유의한 음의 관계를 보여 경영자에게 양도제한조건부주식을 부여한 경우 발생액이익조정이 감소하는 결과를 보고하였다. 경영자보상 유형과 실제이익조정의 관계를 분석한 결과 경영자에게 스톡옵션을 부여한 경우 실제이익조정과 유의한 관계를 갖지 않았으나, 양도제한조건부주식을 부여하거나 스톡옵션과 양도제한조건부주식을 동시에 부여한 경우에는 실제이익조정을 제한하는데 효과적인 것으로 나타났다. [연구의 시사점]결과를 종합해보면 투명한 회계보고와 재무보고의 질을 제고하는데 양도제한조건부주식이 효과적인 인센티브 기재로 작동하는 것을 확인할 수 있으며, 이는 한국에서 비교적 최근 도입된 양도제한조건부주식을 경영자에게 부여하는 것이 주주와 경영자간의 대리인문제를 감소시키고 기업가치를 증대하는데 도움이 될 수 있다는 것을 시사한다.
Abstract
[Purpose]The purpose of this study is to empirically analyze the relationship between stock－based compensation and financial reporting quality of Chinese listed companies. Specifically we classify stock－based compensation types for managers into stock options and restricted stock units (RSU) and to examine whether the earnings manipulation varies depending on the compensation type. [Methodology]In order to analyze the effect of stock－based compensation on earnings management of Chinese listed companies from 2012 to 2021, this study conducts OLS analysis using stock－based compensation divided into stock options and restricted stock unit, and measures earnings management both accrual－based earnings management and real activity－based earnings management. [Findings]The granting of stock options did not have a significant effect on accrual－based earnings management, but RSU showed a significant negative relationship with accrual－based earnings management. According to an analysis of the relationship between the type of stock－based compensation and real activity－based earnings management, stock options were not significantly related to real activity－based earnings management, but it was effective in limiting real activity－based earnings management when RSU were granted or both stock option and RSU granted at the same time. [Implications]Summarizing the results, it can be seen that RSU serve as an effective incentive mechanism to improve the quality of transparent financial reporting, suggesting that granting RSU relatively recently introduced in Korea can help mitigate agency problems between shareholders and managers and increase corporate value.
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