인권의 근거: 후쿠야마와 하버마스의 경우

Abstract

This thesis treats the problem of showing the foundation of universal human rights beyond the cultural difference, i.e. the problem of the justification of human rights. It examines critically Fukuyam's challenging attempt to justify human rights, based on the concept of human nature, and Habermas' attempt to justify human rights in the dimension of law, which is based on the concept of intersubjectivity. By examining these two attempts comparatively, this thesis seeks for the way to justify the universal human rights and simultaneously to show the emerging course of the new categories of human rights. I regard Habermas' attempt to justify universal human rights in the dimension of law as a powerful alternative. It suggests a successful case for justifying human rights, which doesn't appeal to religious or metaphysical doctrines and doesn't be reduced to cultural relativism. I will additionally show that the attention to the emerging course of the new categories of human rights can make us pay attention to the dynamics of struggles for recognition.