인조대 후반 대일위기의식 고조와 대응 전략 모색

Abstract

This thesis is a study examining what kind of justification the Injo regime created and strategic breakthroughs were sought in relation to the policy toward Japan under the dynamic structure of the Manchu War of 1636 as a turning point. First of all, this article examines the process of rising awareness of crisis against Japan before and after the Manchu War of 1636. Next, in the process of assuming the power relations between the East Asian countries and seeking strategies for the crisis consciousness with Japan, we looked at how to respond by creating diplomatic tactics such as diplomatic justification that prepare for the provocation of Japan(備倭論) and hiding the real relationship between Joseon and Qing(朝·淸和親論). ‘Diplomatic justification that prepare for the provocation of Japan’ was embodied in reporting Japan's movements to the Qing Dynasty. The Joseon government was able to form a strategic consensus between Joseon and Qing by delivering the message of threatening Japan's move. The Qing dynasty continued to demand from Joseon to arrange communication with Japan. But the Joseon government achieved certain results by taking a preemptive response. It also maintained the independence of its policy toward Japan while cutting off the link between Qing and Japan. ‘Hiding the real relationship between Joseon and Qing’ was a strategy to conceal from the Japanese side the fact that it had surrendered to the Qing Dynasty after being defeated in the Manchu War of 1636. This strategy seems to have very obvious limitations. It was developed for the purpose of maintaining Joseon's national status in diplomacy with Japan and not revealing its weakness as a defeated country by not revealing the fact that it had suffered from the Manchurians.