조정게임 실험에 관한 최근 연구
A Survey of Experiments on Coordination Games
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참고문헌
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초록
본 논문은 지난 이십 년간 급속하게 발전한 조정게임 이론과 그 실험에 대하여 개관하고 향후의 새로운 전개에 대하여 조망한다. 특히 Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil과 Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross들이 시행한 일련의 조정게임 실험의 결과를 중심으로 조정실패의 문제는 어떻게 발생하는지, 그리고 이를 개선하는 방법들은 얼마나 효과가 있는지를 살펴본다. 아울러 실험 결과를 체계적으로 설명하는 이론적 시도로서 진화게임이론적 접근과 게임학습이론적 접근을 살펴본다. 또한 이후에 계속된 다른 조정게임에 대한 실험들도 고찰한다.
Abstract
This paper provides a literature review of experiments on coordination games. In particular, we focus on two strands of papers on coordination game experiments: One group was done by Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil and the other by Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe and Ross. Coordination failures were observed in both experiments. We explore effectiveness of two kinds of institutions, preplay communication and forward induction, which were used to overcome the coordination problem in the experimental setting. Some theoretical works which tried to explain the experimental data are also reviewed. They were based on evolutionary game theory and the theory of learning in games.
참고문헌 (26)
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