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공공재 게임 실험에서 기여율의 하락: 학습 가설, 전략 가설, 상호적 맞대응 가설의 재평가

The Decay in Contributions in a Public Goods Game: Learning Hypothesis, Strategy Hypothesis and Reciprocity Hypothesis Revisited

최정규|허준석
한국계량경제학회|2012.06|계량경제학보 (Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics)|제23권 제2호|pp. 165-186|DOI http://dx.doi.org/

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키워드

공공재 게임학습 가설전략 가설상호 맞대응 가설Public Goods GameLearning HypothesisStrategy HypothesisReciprocity Hypothesis
주제분류경제학

초록

공공재 게임을 유한한 회수로 반복할 때, 대부분의 실험 연구가 보여주는 바는 실험 참가자들이 초반 50%대으 기여율에서 출발하여 게임이 반복됨에 따라 그 기여율이 점차 하락한다는 것이다. 실험 참가자들의 무조건적인 무임승자는 잘 관찰되지 않는다. 이로부터 실험 참가자들이 왜 이런 행동패턴을 보이는지. 그리고 이러한 행동패턴은 경제이론의 출발점이 되는 경제인이라는 가정으로 부터 이탈하는 것인지 등을 둘러싸고 많은 논의가 이루어져왔다. 본 연구에서는 이러한 논의의 연장선상에서 이러한 행동을 설명하기 위해 제시된 주요한 몇몇 가설들을 재평가하고자 한다. 본 논문에서는 공공재 게임 실험을 통해서 얻어진 결과를 기초로 실험 참가자들이 상호성을 갖고 행동한다는 것, 그리고 행위자들이 상호적 맞대응이 공공재 실험에서 보여주는 일반적인 패턴을 설명하는 데 유효한 요인이 된다는 것을 보일 것이다.

Abstract

Most studies on public goods game reported that in a finitely repeated public good game subjects' contributions begin with an average contribution of about 50% of their initial endowment and decay toward the free riding level as the game progresses. Unconditional free ridings were seldom observed. To explain what causes this behavioral patterns, three hypotheses have been suggested; learning hypothesis, strategy hypothesis and reciprocity hypothesis. This paper investigates these hypotheses, and our findings from public goods experiments suggest that subjects' reciprocity is one of the main causes that produce subjects' behavioral patterns.

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