최후통첩게임의 학습전략과 대응전략에 대한 연구
Learning and Adaptive behavior in the Ultimatum Game
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초록
본 논문은 최후통첩게임(Ultimatum Game: UG)에서 처벌할 수 있는 권한을 도입하고 게임을 반복할 경우 제안자와 응답자의 선택을 실험을 통해서 살펴보았다. 실험결과 제안자는 평균적으로 상대에 대한 정보가 부족한 첫 번째 라운드와 상대가 첫 번째 라운드에서 수락한 경우에 두 번째 라운드에서 제안금액을 높이는 것으로 보아 learning과 adaptive 전략을 사용하는 것으로 설명할 수 있다. 반면 응답자의 전략은 제안자와 달리 수동적이며, 심리적인 요인에 영향을 받는다고 할 수 있다. 따라서 UG에서 반복과 처벌이 주어지더라도 forward-looking 전략보다는 보다 단순한 learning과 adaptive 전략에 의존함을 알 수 있다.
Abstract
In this study, the choices selected by the proponent and respondent were investigated through experiment in the ultimatum game in which the authority to administer punishment was introduced and the game was repeated. The proponent, on average, was shown to use a learning and adaptive strategy by increasing the proposal amount in the second round after the first round in which the counterpart accepted the proposal and held insufficient information on the counterpart. On the contrary, the respondent was shown to take on a passive attitude and be affected by psychological factors, and thus was found to rely on a more simplified learning and adaptive strategy than on a forward-looking strategy even when repetition and punishment were given in the ultimatum game.
참고문헌 (13)
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