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인수기업의 지배구조와 피인수기업의 주주가치

Corporate Governance and Target Shareholder Values

최문섭
한국재무관리학회 (Korea Financial Management Association)|2011.06|재무관리연구 (THE KOREAN JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT)|제28권 제2호|pp. 189-212

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참고문헌

키워드

기업지배구조인수합병Corporate Governance누적초과수익률Mergers and AcquisitionsCumulative Abnormal Return정보거래확률Probability of Informed Trading경영권 방어조항Antitakeover Provision
주제분류경영학

초록

기업지배구조이론에 의하면 열악한 지배구조를 갖는 기업의 경영진일수록 비합리적인 기업투자결정을 내린다는 것이 알려져 있으며, 경영권 방어조항(antitakeover provision, ATP)이 기업정관에 많은 기업이 이에 해당된다는 연구결과가 문헌에 존재한다. 본 연구는 ATP조항이 많은 미국 기업들일 수록 미국과 해외의 상장기업에 대한 인수 발표 시 피인수기업의 누적초과수익률(cumulative abnormal return)이 높다는 결과를 얻었으며, 해외 피인수기업의 수익률이 미국기업의 그것을 평균적으로 상회함을 보여준다. 마지막으로, 이러한 결과는 인수기업 내부정보 유출의 가능성에 대해서도 강건함(robustness)을 보여준다.

Abstract

The theory of corporate governance suggests that managers of poorly governed firms are more likely to make poor investment decisions, and the evidence on high antitakeover provision (ATP) firms is consistent. I study the effect of domestic and foreign takeovers by U.S. firms and find that high-ATP bidders tend to pay relatively high premiums for their targets. Also, foreign targets’ event-study returns are significantly higher than those of U.S. domestic ones. Finally, these findings are robust to controlling for acquirers’ exposure to insider trading.

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