Diverging budget expenses according to election competition : in local governments of Korea
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Elections serve aseffective instruments to identify and sort out the public opinion and assigning representatives for the majority of the public. However, when the ‘ruling’majority cannot be singled out but are in competition with one another, grasping the idea of public opinion would be made difficult. Therefore, elections won by large majority votes versus by close cut would have consequential effects on how the elected officials behave after the election. Building upon this concept, this study examines how the election competition level within local governments influence budget expenditures in development areas, based on Frant’s (1996) high and low-powered incentives of transaction cost theory. The result shows that when the National Assembly election competition is high, less is spent on developmental policies for the local government. Meanwhile, the level of competition election of local government leaders does not have statistically significant effect on the developmental policies. These patterns are in line with previous studies of low- and high-powered incentives of the politicians. The study yields practical implications of how elections not only function for representative democracy but also for public service and policies.
Abstract
Elections serve aseffective instruments to identify and sort out the public opinion and assigning representatives for the majority of the public. However, when the ‘ruling’majority cannot be singled out but are in competition with one another, grasping the idea of public opinion would be made difficult. Therefore, elections won by large majority votes versus by close cut would have consequential effects on how the elected officials behave after the election. Building upon this concept, this study examines how the election competition level within local governments influence budget expenditures in development areas, based on Frant’s (1996) high and low-powered incentives of transaction cost theory. The result shows that when the National Assembly election competition is high, less is spent on developmental policies for the local government. Meanwhile, the level of competition election of local government leaders does not have statistically significant effect on the developmental policies. These patterns are in line with previous studies of low- and high-powered incentives of the politicians. The study yields practical implications of how elections not only function for representative democracy but also for public service and policies.
참고문헌 (46)
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