본문 바로가기
KERD
논문KCI 등재

Why did South Korean Government send troops to the Middle East?- Focusing on Level of Analysis -

0

조회

0

다운로드

0

인용

0

참고문헌

키워드

초록

While national interests are interpreted according to varioustheories, national interests are first policies regarding a nation andthe public’s survival and second economic developments or welfare. In this perspective, that national interests coming from dispatchingtroops to the Middle East reflects how much the nation’s security,economy, welfare areas should be valued as opportunity cost. Tosatisfy this condition, this paper takes a look at the contemporarymodel by which foreign policy to sending troops is decided tomaximize national interests and verifies it, finding out which factorsare important in deciding foreign policies or the issue of deployment. On the basis of limitations of previous studies, this paper explainsregularity and rationality that are noticeable in the process ofsatisficing for interaction and agreement of various factors putforward by limited rationality model and non-rationality model. Thispaper is to reconsider the meaning of international relationship’sinteraction by verifying exactness of Two-Face Game theory,supplementing to Two-Level Game and complementing thelimitations. As we can see before, I use the most flexible analytic frame,explaining the process of South Korea’s decision to send troops byslightly modifying Two Face Game theory. This effort has a meaningin that the new model will be able to secure theory’s explanationpower, strengthening the link between the theory and the reality inanalyzing other troop deployment decisions or economic tradenegotiations. That is, it is an analytic model, which provides anotherflexibility to us, helping explain international negotiations and foreignpolicy variables. Accordingly, it simultaneously makes up for abstractness of Two Level Theory –only two level, domestic leveland international level- and shortcomings of Two Face Theoryunderestimating the meaning of the international community. As aresult, the above model based on Two Face Theory is suitable forexplaining ever changing and various policy decisions by consideringother internal plane’s effects and examining intervention variableswith regard to decision makers’ win-set. Discussions about how toenhance South Korea’s troop deployment diplomacy and measures areunderway. It is timely appropriate to take a close look at what kindsof matters we have in making decisions to send troops and figure outwhat we can do to fix them.

Abstract

While national interests are interpreted according to varioustheories, national interests are first policies regarding a nation andthe public’s survival and second economic developments or welfare. In this perspective, that national interests coming from dispatchingtroops to the Middle East reflects how much the nation’s security,economy, welfare areas should be valued as opportunity cost. Tosatisfy this condition, this paper takes a look at the contemporarymodel by which foreign policy to sending troops is decided tomaximize national interests and verifies it, finding out which factorsare important in deciding foreign policies or the issue of deployment. On the basis of limitations of previous studies, this paper explainsregularity and rationality that are noticeable in the process ofsatisficing for interaction and agreement of various factors putforward by limited rationality model and non-rationality model. Thispaper is to reconsider the meaning of international relationship’sinteraction by verifying exactness of Two-Face Game theory,supplementing to Two-Level Game and complementing thelimitations. As we can see before, I use the most flexible analytic frame,explaining the process of South Korea’s decision to send troops byslightly modifying Two Face Game theory. This effort has a meaningin that the new model will be able to secure theory’s explanationpower, strengthening the link between the theory and the reality inanalyzing other troop deployment decisions or economic tradenegotiations. That is, it is an analytic model, which provides anotherflexibility to us, helping explain international negotiations and foreignpolicy variables. Accordingly, it simultaneously makes up for abstractness of Two Level Theory –only two level, domestic leveland international level- and shortcomings of Two Face Theoryunderestimating the meaning of the international community. As aresult, the above model based on Two Face Theory is suitable forexplaining ever changing and various policy decisions by consideringother internal plane’s effects and examining intervention variableswith regard to decision makers’ win-set. Discussions about how toenhance South Korea’s troop deployment diplomacy and measures areunderway. It is timely appropriate to take a close look at what kindsof matters we have in making decisions to send troops and figure outwhat we can do to fix them.

참고문헌 (31)

  1. Ahn Byung Joon, "The Obama Administaration's Foreign Policy and the Future of the Korean Peninsula", Korean Observations on Foreign Relations, 12(1) (2010)
  2. Beverley Milton-Edwards, "Contemporary Politics in the Middle East" (2011), Polity
  3. Charles L. Prichard, "chairs; Scott A. Snyder, project director; foreword, Richard N. Haass, U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula" (2010), The Council On Foreign Relations
  4. Eugene R. Wittkopf, "American Foreign Policy –Pattern and process -" (2008), Thomson
  5. F. E. Fiedler, "A Theory of Leadership Effectiveness" (1967), McGrawHill
  6. Freedom House, "Freedom on the Net : A global assessment of Internet and digital media" (2009)
  7. Glenn H. Snyder, "Alliance Politics" (2007), Cornell University Press
  8. Henry Kissinger, "Diplomacy" (1994), Simon&Schuster
  9. 홍순남, "이라크파병을 계기로 본 한국·중동 협력관계 - 정치・외교적 측면 분석 -", 한국중동학회논총, 25(1), pp.1~32 (2004), 한국중동학회
  10. J.David Singer, "The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations", World Politics, 14(1), pp.77~92 (1961), The International System: Theoretical Essays
  11. Jeon Ki Woong, "Two-face game: an alternative to Robert D. Putnam's two-level game theory" (2006), K-Study
  12. Jonathan H. Ping, "Middle Power Statecraft" (2005), ASHGATE
  13. Kwan Ok Kim, "An Analysis of Dispatch Diplomacy of the Korean Troops from the Two-Level Approach: A Comparative Analysis of Dispatching Policies of the Korean Troops toward Vietnam and Iraq" (2005), the Korean Political Science Society
  14. Peter Gourevitch, "The Second image reversed : the international sources of domestic politics", International Organization, 32(4) (1978)
  15. Paul F. Diehl, "War and Peace in International Rivalry" (2001), The University of Michigan Press
  16. Putnam, Robert D., "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics : the Logic of Two-Level games", International Organization, 42(3) (1988)
  17. Robert O. Keohane, "After Hegemony" (1984), Princeton University Press
  18. Rosenau, James N., "The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy" (1980), Nocolas Publishing Company
  19. Stephen Waltz, "The origins of alliance" (1990), Cornell University Press
  20. Kenneth N Waltz, "Man, the State and War : A Theoretical Analysis" (1959), Columbia University Press
  21. Zbigniew Brzenzinski, "Strategic Vision" (2012), Basic Books
  22. "Aljajeera News"[URL]
  23. "Asia Times"[URL]
  24. "BBC News"[URL]
  25. "International Herald Tribune"[URL]
  26. "Reuter News"[URL]
  27. "한국국방연구원 홈페이지"[URL]
  28. "세종연구소 홈페이지"[URL]
  29. "중앙일보"[URL]
  30. "한겨례신문"[URL]
  31. "대한민국 국방부 파병공감"[URL]

관련 논문AI추천

이 간행물의 다른 논문 (9건)